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THESES
•	 Significant	changes	on	the	European	gas	market	have	taken	place	over	the	
past	few	years.	The	liberalisation	process	has	gained	momentum;	one	es-
sential	element	of	it	comprises	the	new	legal	regulations,	in	particular,	the	
so-called	 third	energy	package.	The	European	Commission’s	significance	
in	energy	relations	between	the	EU	and	its	member	states	and	Russia	has	
grown.	Efforts	aimed	at	diversifying	the	sources	of	gas	supply	to	Europe	
are	being	continued,	in	particular	through	imports	of	liquefied	natural	gas	
(LNG).	Furthermore,	gas	trade	rules	are	gradually	evolving.	
•	 The	recent	changes,	especially	 in	 the	area	of	 legal	 regulations,	are	unfa-
vourable	to	Russia.	As	a	consequence	of	these	changes,	the	long-lived	en-
ergy	inter-dependence	between	Europe	and	Russia,	which	has	been	asym-
metrically	beneficial	for	Moscow,	has	been	gaining	balance	over	the	past	
few	years.	As	a	result	of	improving	competitiveness	on	the	European	mar-
ket	and	progress	in	building	the	common	energy	market	–	at	a	time	of	po-
litical	stability	–	the	role	of	natural	gas	as	an	instrument	in	Russian	foreign	
policy	is	lessening.	On	the	other	hand,	doubts	as	to	whether	the	liberalisa-
tion	tendencies	will	last	long	(delays	in	the	implementation	of	EU	regula-
tions	in	some	member	states)	and	the	decrease	in	LNG	supplies	observed	
in	2012–2013,	along	with	the	expected	decline	in	Europe’s	own	production,	
provide	Russia	with	a	chance	of	maintaining	its	position	in	relations	with	
the	EU	and	possibly	 even	of	 reinforcing	 it	within	 the	next	 three	or	 four	
years.	
•	 Russia,	being	aware	of	the	evolution	of	the	EU	gas	market	and	the	fluctua-
tions	in	trends	that	accompany	it,	and	in	an	attempt	to	maintain	its	posi-
tion	on	the	European	gas	market,	is	sticking	to	a	dichotomous	strategy.	On	
the	one	hand,	Moscow	has	taken	an	offensive approach to	the	challenges.	
Firstly,	it	continues	its	traditionally	critical	rhetoric	with	regard	to	the	legal	
and	institutional	changes;	and	this	rhetoric	is	likely	to	strengthen	further	
as	Russia	will	capitalise	on	the	market	trends	which	have	been	beneficial	
to	 it	 (especially	 in	2013).	Secondly,	by	negating	the	 legitimacy	of	 the	new	
rules,	 it	has	been	making	efforts	 to	undermine	 them	by	employing	 legal	
instruments	(for	example,	contesting	the	regulations	of	the	third	energy	
package	 on	 30	 April	 2014	 through	 the	WTO	 Dispute	 Settlement	Mecha-
nism)	and	political	measures	(especially	by	enhancing	bilateral	energy	re-
lations	with	selected	EU	member	states,	thus	making	it	more	difficult	for	
the	EU	to	conduct	a	cohesive	energy	policy).	Thirdly,	Russia	has	used	such	
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traditional	 economic	means	 as	 investments	 in	 assets	 (transmission	 net-
works,	gas	storage	facilities	and	companies	active	on	the	gas	trade	market)	
and	pushing	through	the	implementation	of	new	gas	pipeline	construction	
projects	 (South	Stream	and	potentially	 the	 third	and	 fourth	branches	of	
Nord	Stream).	On	the	other	hand,	the	evolution	of	the	EU	gas	market	has	
forced	Russia	to	take	steps to adapt	 to	a	certain	extent.	This	is	 illustrat-
ed	by	both	partial	changes	in	the	operation	of	the	internal	gas	sector	(the	
liberalisation	of	gas	export	rules	regarding	LNG)	and	promises	to	further	
curb	Gazprom’s	dominant	position.	Another	proof	of	 this	are	the	conces-
sions	made	in	trade	negotiations	with	European	partners	(modifications	of	
contract	terms,	including	gas	price	reductions)	and	adjustments	to	the	EU’s	
market	liberalising	regulations	to	a	limited	extent.	
•	 Given	the	special	characteristics	of	Russian	politics,	above	all	the	nature	of	
the	decision-making	mechanisms,	one	should	not,	however,	assume	that	
the	evolution	of	the	EU	gas	market	would	bring	about	any	durable	systemic	
changes	 in	 the	 Russian	 gas	 sector	 within	 a	 short	 timeframe.	 Neverthe-
less,	 the	 intensifying	 rivalry	between	Russian	 energy	firms	 (such	as	 ac-
tions	taken	by	so-called	independent	producers,	Rosneft	and	Novatek,	to	
consistently	reduce	Gazprom’s	position	on	the	Russian	gas	market	and	in	
gas	exports)	might	serve	as	a	catalyst	for	such	changes.	As	regards	the	gas	
strategy	for	foreign	markets,	it	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	in	the	case	of	le-
gal	confrontation	with	EU	institutions	a	key	change	in	this	strategy	would	
include	a	kind	of	gas	rebranding	 involving	demonopolisation	of	 the	Rus-
sian	presence	on	the	EU	gas	market	(in	addition	to	gas	supplied	by	Gazprom	
using	the	pipeline	system,	LNG	could	also	be	supplied	from	Russia	by	so-
called	independent	gas	producers,	above	all	Novatek).	
•	 However,	Moscow	hopes	that	 the	unfolding	situation	on	the	gas	markets	
will	contribute	to	slowing	down	the	recent	liberalisation	tendencies	in	the	
EU.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	very	 likely	 that	 the	Kremlin	will	 try	 to	 capitalise	
on	 the	Ukrainian	crisis	 and	 the	EU’s	previous	dependence	on	Ukrainian	
transit	to	revise	the	rules	of	gas	co-operation	with	Brussels	more	substan-
tially	(by	total	or	partial	exclusion	of	internal	EU	regulations	concerning	
the	gas	market	and	through	reaching	a	political	agreement	that	will	set	the	
grounds	for	Russia-EU	energy	co-operation	in	a	comprehensive	manner).	
Moscow	is	thus	preparing	itself	for	the	‘long	game’	in	gas	with	its	European	
partners.	Since	the	EU	member	states	and	institutions	have	not	developed	
a	common	stance	on	this	issue,	Moscow	does	not	seem	set	to	lose	this	game.	
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INTRODUCTION
The	European	gas	market	is	the	world’s	third	largest	regional	gas	market	(af-
ter	North	America	and	the	former	Soviet	republics)1.	Since	the	1950s,	it	has	in-
variably	been	viewed	as	a	priority	market	in	Russian	external	energy	policy.	
At	present	(full	data	for	2013),	93%	of	total	Russian	gas	exports	(98.5%	in	2012)	
go	to	the	European	market	within	the	broad	meaning	of	the	term	(including	
Turkey),	where	the	European	Union	accounts	for	67%	of	the	supplies	(56.8	%	in	
2012),	European	countries	which	do	not	belong	to	the	EU	or	CIS	account	for	14%	
(around	14%	in	2012,	as	well),	and	the	European	non-EU	member	states	which	
belong	to	CIS	for	around	15%	(27.7%	in	2012).	Detailed	data	concerning	EU	mem-
ber	states	is	presented	in	Table	1.	
Table 1.	The	volume	of	Russian	gas	exports	to	individual	EU	member	states234
Country
Gas consumption (bcm)3 Volume of gas imported from Russia (bcm)4
2010 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Germany 83.3 74.5 83.2 88.5 34.02 33.16 40.18
Italy 76.1 71.3 73.4 68.7 17.08 15.08 25.33
United 
Kingdom 99.2 82.8 79.2 79.2 8.16 8.11 12.46
Poland 15.5 15.7 16.3 16.3 10.25 9.94 9.8
France 47.4 40.9 45.6 46.1 9.53 8.04 8.21
Czech 
Republic 9.3 8.4 8.0 8.1 7.59 7.28 7.32
Hungary 10.9 10.4 10.1 9.3 6.26 5.29 6.0
1	 In	2011,	gas	consumption	in	North	America	was	at	869	bcm,	in	former	Soviet	republics	at	703	
bcm,	and	in	Europe	at	525	bcm.	World	Energy	Outlook	2013,	page	103.	
2	 Data	from	Table	1	covers	both	gas	exported	from	the	Russian	Federation	and	gas	bought	by	
Gazprom	from	other	sources	and	supplied	to	European	recipients.	
3	 Data	from	Eurogas.
4	 Data	from	the	official	website	of	GazpromExport.
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Country
Gas consumption (bcm)3 Volume of gas imported from Russia (bcm)4
2010 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Slovakia 5.6 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.89 4.19 5.42
Austria 10.1 9.5 8.9 8.3 5.43 5.22 5.23
Finland 3.9 3.4 3.6 3.4 4.19 3.48 3.56
Bulgaria 2.6 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.81 2.53 2.76
Lithuania 3.1 3.4 3.2 2.6 3.4 3.32 2.7
Greece 3.7 4.5 4.4 3.8 2.9 2.5 2.62
Holland 43.6 38.1 39.5 40.3 4.37 2.31 2.13
Romania 13.6 13.9 13.4 11.6 2.82 2.17 1.19
Latvia 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.25 1.12 1.13
Estonia 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.69 0.64 0.73
Slovenia 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.53 0.5 0.54
Denmark 5.0 4.2 3.5 3.3 0.05 0.33 0.33
Croatia – – 2.9 2.8 – – –
EU total 502.9 453.1 405.8 402.7 127.22 115.21 137.64
Author’s	calculations	based	on	data	published	by	Eurogas,	GazpromExport	and	BP	Statistical	Review.	
Those	EU	member	states	which	traditionally	form	the	main	group	of	Russian	
gas	recipients	play	a	special	role.	From	among	them,	Germany	is	the	most	im-
portant	partner	for	Gazprom:	in	2013,	Germany	bought	40.18	bcm	of	Russian	
gas	and	Italy	bought	25.33	bcm,	accounting	for	29.1%	and	18.4%	of	Russian	gas	
exports	 to	Russia,	 respectively.	 In	 turn,	 as	 regards	European	non-EU	mem-
ber	states,	Turkey,	with	imports	at	26.61	bcm	in	2013	5,	is	a	particularly	impor-
tant	outlet	for	Russian	gas.	According	to	data	published	by	GazpromExport	in	
mid	February	2014,	Russia’s	 share	 in	 the	European	gas	consumption	market	
5	 Data	 from	 the	 website	 of	 GazpromExport:	 http://www.gazpromexport.ru/statistics/	
(accessed	on:	30	January	2014).	
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(the	EU,	Turkey	and	other	European	recipients	of	Russian	gas	taken	together)	
reached	its	highest	level	in	history	at	30%6.	
Gas	sale	to	Europe	accounts	for	more	than	half	of	Gazprom’s	income.	Although	
income	from	gas	sales	does	not	contribute	to	the	state	budget	as	much	as	income	
from	oil	exports7,	it	is	still	treated	as	an	important	source	of	income	for	the	Rus-
sian	government	elite	and	used	to	finance	cost-intensive	social	projects	or	spe-
cial	organisational	projects,	such	as	Sochi	2014	Olympics8.	Therefore,	changes	
taking	place	on	the	European	gas	market,	where	Gazprom	is	the	only	Russian	
entity	as	yet,	pose	a	very	serious	challenge	to	the	government	in	Moscow.	
Chart 1.	The	share	of	gas	supplied	by	Gazprom	in	total	gas	consumption	in	the	EU
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Sources:	www.eurogas.org;	www.gazpromexport.ru
6	 ‘Доля «Газпрома» на рынке Европы достигла исторического максимума’,	Ведомости,	
18	 February	 2014,	 http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/22888731/dolya-gazproma-
na-rynke-evropy-vozrosla-v-2013-godu-s-254-do	(accessed	on:	18	February	2014).	Gas	sup-
ply	volumes	reached	a	record	high	in	2006–2008:	166.4	bcm	of	gas	in	2006,	173.8	bcm	in	2007	
and	171.7	bcm	in	2008.	‘Gazprom	in	Figures	2005–2009’,	page	56.	
7	 Income	from	oil	and	gas	sales	in	2013	accounted	for	46.1%	of	the	Russian	Federation’s	budget	
(oil	sales	generated	US$194	billion	and	gas	sales	US$28	billion).	
8	 Gazprom	directors’	wages	and	bonuses	in	2013	were	worth	around	US$49.7	million	in	aggre-
gate.	 ‘Газпром себя не обделил’,	http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2014/02/15/5908845.sht-
ml	(accessed	on:	16	February	2014).	According	to	media	reports,	Gazprom	invested	around	
US$5-6	 billion	 in	 the	 construction	 of	Olympic	 infrastructure	 in	 Sochi;	 http://1prime.ru/
Finance/20130226/761411889.html	(accessed	on:	17	October	2013).	
10
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 9
/2
01
4
I. CHANGES TAKING PLACE ON THE EUROPEAN GAS 
mARKET AND THEIR CONSEqUENCES FOR RUSSIA 
The	evolution	of	the	European	gas	market	covers:	legislative changes (above	
all,	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 so-called	 energy	 packages,	 including	 directives	
and	 regulations	 aimed	 at	 liberalising	 the	EU	 energy	market);	 institutional 
changes (the	 increasing	 significance	 of	 the	 European	 Commission	 as	 re-
gards	enforcement	of	applicable	regulations	in	the	energy	sector,	for	example	
through	 the	use	of	measures	aimed	at	 legal	protection	of	competition	 in	 the	
EU’s	 internal	market);	economic changes linked to change in the market 
structure (attempts	at	diversifying	the	sources	of	oil	and	gas	supplies,	the	de-
velopment	of	infrastructure	used	to	transport	and	store	oil	and	gas	inside	the	
EU,	and	the	evolution	of	gas	trade	rules).	
1. The legal and institutional changes and their consequences  
for Russia 
One	of	 the	most	 serious	 changes	on	 the	EU	gas	market	 are	 the	new	energy 
law regulations, and	in	particular	the	so-called	third	energy	package,	which	
as	yet	includes	three	regulations	and	two	directives9	(and	network	codes	are	
being	developed),	aimed	at	deepening	 the	 liberalisation	of	 the	European	gas	
and	electricity	markets.	Regulations	which	provide	for	unbundling	of	gas	pro-
duction	from	their	transport	and	distribution	to	end	users	is	among	the	key	
elements	of	the	third	energy	package.	EU	regulations	offer	member	states	the	
choice	of	one	of	the	three	models	of	unbundling:	(1)	ownership unbundling	
(one	and	the	same	entity	may	not	at	the	same	time	produce	the	raw	material	
and	control	its	transit	and	distribution);	(2)	the	so-called	Independent System 
Operator (ISO)	model,	where	the	owner	of	the	transmission	network	(a	verti-
cally	integrated	entity)	has	the	obligation	to	indicate	the	transmission	operator	
who	 is	 formally	 independent	 from	 the	owner	 (meets	 the	ownership	unbun-
dling	criteria);	(3)	the	so-called	Independent Transmission Operator (ITO)	
9	 Directive	2009/73/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	13	July	2009	concern-
ing	common	rules	for	the	internal	market	in	natural	gas	and	repealing	Directive	2003/55/EC;	
Directive	2009/72/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	13	July	2009	concern-
ing	common	rules	for	the	internal	market	in	electricity	and	repealing	Directive	2003/54/EC;	
Regulation	(EC)	No.	713/2009	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	13	July	2009	
establishing	an	Agency	for	the	Cooperation	of	Energy	Regulators	(ACER);	Regulation	(EC)	No.	
714/2009	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	13	July	2009	on	conditions	for	ac-
cess	to	the	network	for	cross-border	exchanges	in	electricity;	Regulation	(EC)	No.	715/2009	
of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	13	July	2009	on	conditions	for	access	to	the	
natural	gas	transmission	networks	and	repealing	Regulation	(EC)	No.	1775/2005.	
11
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 9
/2
01
4
model,	where	the	transmission	system	operator	and	owner	is	a	vertically	inte-
grated	company,	which	however	undertakes	that	its	two	parts	(one	in	charge	
of	sales	and	the	other	in	charge	of	transmission)	will	in	practice	operate	inde-
pendently,	and	their	independence	will	be	controlled	by	a	special	supervisory	
body.	Another	essential	 item	is	the	so-called	Gazprom	clause10,	which	envis-
ages	 that	 third-country	 entities	may	be	 allowed	 to	 control	 the	 transmission	
system	or	transmission	system	operator	only	if	they	meet	the	requirements	of	
effective	unbundling	set	under	one	of	the	three	aforementioned	unbundling	
models.	One	important	element	of	the	regulations	is	the	TPA	(Third-Party	Ac-
cess)	principle,	which	formerly	applied	in	earlier	market	liberalising	directives	
and	was	extended	to	the	gas	storage	sector	as	part	of	the	third	energy	package.	
This	principle	imposes	the	obligation	on	operators	to	guarantee	equal	access	to	
infrastructure	to	all	market	participants,	including	transit	gas	pipelines	and	
gas	storage	facilities,	and	allows	exclusions	only	in	strictly	defined	cases.	The	
new	regulations	were	introduced	above	all	to	improve	competitiveness	and	to	
subsequently	cause	a	reduction	in	energy	prices.	These	regulations	are	of	spe-
cial	importance	because	they	are	in	force	not	only	in	the	EU;	the	member	states	
of	the	Energy	Community	are	also	obliged	to	implement	them11.	
The	trend	in	regulatory	changes	on	the	EU	market	(demonopolisation	in	indi-
vidual	member	states	which	is	aimed	not	only	at	improving	competitiveness	in	
the	horizontal	dimension	-	having	numerous	gas	suppliers	present	in	the	mar-
ket	-	but	also	in	the	vertical	dimension,	i.e.	unbundling	supplies	from	transit	
and	distribution)	contradicts	the	rules	according	to	which	the	Russian	market	
operates.	One	characteristic	of	the	Russian	model	is	low	competitiveness,	with	
Gazprom	holding	 the	dominant	position.	The	state,	and	especially	President	
Vladimir	 Putin,	 holds	 a	 strict	 political	 control	 over	 this	 company.	 Gazprom	
functions	as	a	vertically	integrated	structure	and	is	not	only	in	charge	of	the	
greater	part	of	the	Russian	gas	output	but	also	fully	controls	the	transmission	
network	and	still	has	a	statutorily	guaranteed	monopoly	over	Russian	gas	ex-
ports	via	the	pipeline	system12.	
10	 This	regulation	concerns	all	entities	from	third	countries	but	in	fact	was	introduced	pri-
marily	with	a	view	to	Gazprom.
11	 Moldova,	Ukraine,	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina,	Serbia,	Montenegro,	Kosovo,	Macedonia	and	
Albania.	
12	 The	restrictions	on	Gazprom’s	export	monopoly	imposed	on	1	December	2013	concern	only	
liquefied	natural	gas.	For	more	see:	Szymon	Kardaś,	‘A	feigned	liberalisation:	Russia	is	re-
stricting	 Gazprom’s	monopoly	 on	 exports’,	OSW Commentary,	 28	 November	 2013,	 http://
www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_121_0.pdf
12
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As	the	member	states	of	the	European	Union	and	the	Energy	Community	adopt	
the	third	energy	package,	Gazprom’s	position	on	the	European	market	might	
be	tangibly	undermined.	The	implementation	of	the	EU	regulations	is	putting	
at	stake	Russian	assets	since	this	entails	the	introduction	of	the	unbundling	
principle	in	the	member	states.	Furthermore,	it	is	unclear	whether	some	in-
frastructural	projects	will	be	carried	through	now	that	 the	TPA	rule	(third-
party	access	 to	 transport	 infrastructure	and	gas	 storage	 facilities)	has	been	
introduced.	
The	obligation	to	reserve	transport	capacity	to	ensure	adequate	levels	of	sup-
ply,	which	has	been	imposed	as	part	of	regulations	liberalising	the	EU	gas	mar-
ket,	is	viewed	as	another	serious	challenge	by	Gazprom.	The	route	via	which	
Russian	gas	is	supplied	to	European	recipients	under	long-term	contracts	cur-
rently	in	force	runs	through	more	than	one	EU	member	state	(with	the	excep-
tion	of	Finland,	Hungary,	Poland,	Slovakia,	Romania	and	the	Baltic	states).	The	
implementation	of	the	new	regulations	will	mean	that	Gazprom	will	have	to	
reserve	the	capacity	for	each	territorial	section	through	which	the	exported	
gas	flows	separately.	
Most	 long-term	 gas	 supply	 contracts	 with	 Gazprom	 will	 expire	 between	
2025	and	2036.	In	turn,	the	contracts	which	regulate	gas	transit	issues	will	
expire	between	2015	and	2025.	The	introduction	of	the	new	gas	trade	model	
will	 force	Gazprom	 to	 reserve	 transport	 capacities	offered	by	operators	on	
auctions	 to	 be	 able	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 long-term	 contracts	 binding	 upon	
it.	Gazprom	has	 found	 itself	 in	a	significantly	more	difficult	situation	than	
other	existing	gas	suppliers	to	the	European	market.	The	number	of	border	
points,	and	thus	territorial	sections	through	which	Russian	gas	flows	to	the	
gas	reception	points	agreed	in	the	contracts,	is	much	larger	than	in	the	case	
of	gas	supplies	from	Norway	or	Algeria.	For	Gazprom	this	will	entail	the	need	
to	reserve	transport	capacity	vested	in	all	the	countries	through	which	the	
Russian	gas	transit	route	runs.	Another	problem	could	be	that,	pursuant	to	
the	new	regulations,	the	volume	of	transport	capacity	offered	on	auctions	for	
long-term	reservations	will	be	lower	than	the	volume	of	the	transport	capac-
ity	of	existing	networks.	This	 is	 so	because	 transmission	system	operators	
have	been	obliged	to	reserve	at	least	10%	of	the	transport	capacity	of	a	given	
point	for	short-term	products,	with	a	term	not	longer	than	three	months	and	
at	least	10%	of	the	transport	capacity	for	medium-term	products,	with	a	term	
of	up	to	one	year.	The	remaining	capacity	(80%)	can	be	sold	as	part	of	long-
term	contracts,	with	a	term	of	up	to	15	years.	
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The	regulatory	changes	are	also	accompanied	by	the	European	Commission’s	
becoming	more determined in	enforcing	EU	law	as	regards	liberalisation	of	
the	energy	market	in	the	EU	and	observing	competition	rules	applicable	in	the	
EU.	This	in	particular	concerns	the	Directorate-General	for	Energy	and	the	Di-
rectorate-General	for	Competition.	It	turned	out	that	this	process	has	affected	
Russia	very	much.	In	September	2012,	the	European	Commission	launched	offi-
cial	antitrust	proceedings	against	Gazprom	on	charges	of	abusing	its	dominant	
position	in	ten	Central	European	countries	by	means	of	(1)	limiting	the	free-
dom	of	movement	of	gas	between	EU	member	states,	(2)	preventing	attempts	
to	diversify	gas	supplies	to	EU	countries	and	(3)	imposing	unfair	prices	upon	
contractors.	The	European	Commission’s	actions	were	preceded	by	an	investi-
gation,	initiated	in	September	2011,	involving	the	search	for	and	examination	
of	documents	in	20	EU	gas	companies	affiliated	with	Gazprom	(both	subsidiar-
ies	and	joint	ventures),	as	well	as	in	Gazprom’s	contractors	and	transmission	
operators	in	some	EU	countries13.	
This	trend	has	also	been	illustrated	by	the	stance	the	European	Commission	
has	taken	on	the	intergovernmental	agreements	concluded	by	Russia	with	EU	
member	states	and	Serbia	in	connection	with	the	implementation	of	the	South	
Stream	project.	Brussels	 is	questioning	the	agreements’	compliance	with	EU	
law,	suggesting	that	they	should	be	amended	accordingly.	The	European	Com-
mission	has	highlighted	three	major	elements	as	part	of	its	reservations:	the	
failure	 to	ensure	 third-party	access	 to	 the	planned	gas	pipeline,	contrary	 to	
the	principle	applicable	in	the	EU,	Gazprom’s	exclusive	right	to	set	the	transit	
tariffs	and	the	management	of	the	new	pipeline.	
Brussels	has	declared	its	readiness	to	embark	upon	negotiations	with	Russia	
as	regards	the	agreements	on	South	Stream	on	behalf	of	the	EU	member	states	
concerned14,	and	thus	has	set	a	precedent	which	is	unfavourable	for	Moscow	
as	it	undermines	bilateral	talks	with	EU	member	states,	the	form	of	contacts	
which	Russia	prefers.	
13	 Szymon	 Kardaś,	 ‘The	 European	 Commission	 opens	 antitrust	 proceedings	 against	
Gazprom’,	OSW Analyses,	5	September	2012,		http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2012-09-05/european-commission-opens-antitrust-proceedings-against-gazprom	
14	 The	legal	grounds	which	enable	the	European	Commission	to	become	engaged	in	such	talks	
are	provided	by	the	Decision	No.	994/2012/EU	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Coun-
cil	of	25	October	2012	establishing	an	information	exchange	mechanism	with	regard	to	in-
tergovernmental	 agreements	between	Member	States	 and	 third	 countries	 in	 the	field	of	
energy.	
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2. market changes in the EU’s gas sector and their consequences  
for Russia 
The	European	gas	market	has	seen	major	changes	in	supply	and	demand	over	
the	past	decade	or	so.	On	the	one	hand,	periodical	gas	supply	fluctuations	have	
occurred	in	Europe:	the	consistent	decrease in own production, increased 
competition and	diversification of	supply	sources	(mainly	LNG).	On	the	oth-
er	hand,	variability in demand for	gas	has	been	observed	over	the	past	few	
years	in	Europe	due	to	the	difficult	economic	situation.	In	addition	to	all	this,	
the	gas trade rules have been evolving (the	contracting	practice	has	changed	
and	hubs	and	gas	exchanges	have	developed).	
2.1. Changes	in	supply	and	demand
One	important	factor	which	has	affected	the	situation	in	the	EU	gas	sector	is	
the	regular decrease in own natural gas production in the EU. While	in	
2011	gas	output	reached	around	185	bcm,	in	2020	it	is	expected15	to	fall	to	135	
bcm,	and	in	2035	even	to	104	bcm.	Gas	production	forecasts	for	Norway,	one	
of	the	key	suppliers	of	natural	gas	to	the	EU,	are	less	pessimistic	but	still	un-
favourable	in	the	longer	term.	In	2011	its	gas	output	reached	101	bcm,	in	2020	
it	is	planned16	to	grow	to	121	bcm	annually,	and	in	2035	it	is	expected	to	fall	to	
111	bcm.	
The	chances	that	the	EU	will	increase	its	gas	output	through	shale	gas	extrac-
tion	are	uncertain,	to	say	the	least.	This	can	be	concluded	from	preliminary	
geological	work	and	exploration	drilling	carried	out	in	Bulgaria,	Romania	and	
Poland.	The	lack	of	a	common	stance	on	the	ecological	impact	of	possible	shale	
gas	extraction	 inside	the	European	Union	(some	member	states	are	opposed	
to	it	due	to	the	potential	threat	to	the	natural	environment)	 is	an	additional	
impediment.	
The	increasing	share	of	LNG	on	the	European	gas	market	seen	in	the	first	dec-
ade	of	the	21st	century	has	been	an	essential	element	of	the	changes;	a	consist-
ent	growth	in	LNG	supplies	to	the	European	market	could	be	observed	from	
15	 This	in	particular	concerns	the	United	Kingdom	and	Holland	(in	2013,	the	output	of	Holland’s	
largest	field,	Groningen,	reached	54	bcm,	and	is	expected	to	fall	to	42.5	bcm	in	2014–2015).	
http://media.argusmedia.com/~/media/Files/PDFs/Samples/Argus-Gas-Connections.pdf	
(accessed	on:	20	January	2014).	
16	 ‘World	Energy	Outlook	2013’,	page	109.	
15
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 9
/2
01
4
45	bcm	in	200517	 to	around	90	bcm	in	2010.	This	upward	trend	was	reversed	
in	2012,	and	LNG	imports	to	Europe	fell	noticeably	to	66.75	bcm,	i.e.	as	much	
as	26%	as	compared	to	the	preceding	year18.	The	greatest	falls	in	supply	levels	
were	seen	in	the	case	of	the	largest	LNG	importers:	Spain	(by	16%,	imports	at	
19.95	bcm),	the	United	Kingdom	(by	44%,	to	14.32	bcm)	and	France	(by	32%,	to	
9.89	bcm).	LNG	imports	shrank	even	more	in	201319,	30.25%,	reaching	the	level	
of	46.56	bcm.	
Table 2.	LNG	imports	to	Europe	in	2010–2013	(bcm)
2010 2011 2012 2013
Europe
Quantity	 90 90.47 66.75 46.56
Change	in	% +	1 -	26 -	30.25
Asia
Quantity 185.4 211.09 229.85 244.23
Change	in	% +	13.85 +8.8 +6.2
Author’s	calculations	based	on	IGU	World	LNG	Report	–	2013	Edition;	IGU	World	LNG	Report	–	2014	Edition.
Table 3.	Regasification	potential	of	EU	member	states	(as	of	April	2014)
Country No. of terminals Total regasification capacity (bcm)
Belgium 1 9
France 3 23.75
Greece 1 5.3
Spain 6 60.1
17	 http://www.eurogas.org/uploads/media/statistics_2005_01.01.05.pdf	(accessed	on	30	April	2014).	
18	 D.	Bonhomme,	‘Competition	pipeline	gas	vs.	LNG	in	Europe’,	a	presentation	announced	dur-
ing	the	17th	International	Conference	&	Exhibition	on	Liquefied	Natural	Gas,	http://www.
gastechnology.org/Training/Documents/LNG17-proceedings/06_03-D-Bonhomme-Pres-
entation.pdf
19	 World	LNG	Report	–	2013	Edition,	http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-pub-
lications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf;	World	LNG	Report	–	2014	Edition,	http://www.
igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-publications/igu-world-lng-report-2014-edition.pdf	
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Country No. of terminals Total regasification capacity (bcm)
Holland 1 12
Portugal 1 7.9
United Kingdom 4 52.7
Italy 3 14.71
Total 20 185.46
Author’s	calculations	based	on	data	published	by	Gas	Infrastructure	Europe	and	World	LNG	Report	2014	
One	characteristic	feature	which	has	accompanied	the	emergence	of	LNG	on	
the	European	gas	market	is	the	increase in competition, namely	a	higher	
number	of	countries	supplying	gas	to	the	EU	(from	14	to	23	between	2000	
and	2010).	In	addition	to	Russia,	Norway,	Algeria	and	Holland,	exporters	of	
gas	to	the	European	market	now	include	Egypt,	Qatar20,	and	Nigeria.	Other	
exporters,	such	as	Oman,	Peru	and	Trinidad	and	Tobago	also	hold	a	small	
market	share.	
Changes in demand on	the	gas	market	has	been	an	important	factor	affect-
ing	the	market’s	structure.	The	economic	crisis	in	European	countries	and	the	
related	slow	economic	growth	have	been	the	main	cause	of	falling	demand	for	
gas	in	the	EU.	Other	important	factors	include	maintaining	the	significance	of	
coal	in	the	energy	sectors	of	many	key	EU	countries	(in	contrast	to	the	USA,	
where	cheap	gas	has	been	replacing	coal	to	an	increasing	extent)	and	more	and	
more	interest	in	the	use	of	renewable	energy	seen	among	EU	member	states.	
The	EU’s	energy	and	climate	policy	is	also	an	important,	albeit	not	a	key,	factor.	
The	EU’s	plan	to	reduce	CO2	emissions	and	coal	usage	envisages	an	increase	in	
demand	for	natural	gas.	
However,	the	decrease	in	consumption	abated	in	2011–2013	in	Europe.	In	2011,	
gas	consumption	fell	by	10%	in	comparison	to	the	preceding	year,	in	2012	–	by	
2%	year-on-year,	and	in	2013	–by	only	1.4%21.	Long-term	forecasts	are	also	very	
optimistic	for	suppliers;	it	is	expected	that	the	share	of	natural	gas	in	electric-
20	 In	2003–2010,	Qatar’s	LNG	exports	to	Europe	grew	almost	17	times.	
21	 ‘Drop	in	2013	EU	gas	demand	emphasises	need	for	swift	change’	http://www.eurogas.org/
uploads/media/Eurogas_Press_Release_-_Drop_in_2013_EU_gas_demand_emphasises_
need_for_swift_change.pdf	(accessed	on:	21	March	2014).	
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ity	production	in	the	EU	will	grow	from	25%	in	2010	to	28%	in	2035	in	the	base	
scenario	(up	to	33%	in	the	case	where	EU	climate	policy	guidelines	are	rapidly	
implemented).	Furthermore,	the	overall	level	of	demand	for	gas	in	the	EU	is	ex-
pected	to	grow	from	486.6	bcm	in	2010	to	523.2	bcm	in	2035	in	the	base	scenario	
(up	 to	 585.4	bcm	 in	 the	 case	where	EU	climate	policy	guidelines	are	 rapidly	
implemented)22.
The	decrease	in	demand	for	Russian	gas	in	the	EU	has	for	Russia	been	a	pal-
pable	 consequence	 of	 the	 changes	 on	 the	 EU	market.	 Gazprom	had	 consist-
ently	maintained	its	position	on	the	EU	gas	market,	one	basic	manifestation	of	
which	was	Europe’s	continuing	dependence	on	Russian	gas	imports23.	Russian	
gas	supplies	reached	their	peak	 (173.8	bcm)	 in	2007.	Since	 then,	demand	for	
Russian	gas	in	Europe	has	been	falling	on	a	regular	basis.	One	of	the	main	rea-
sons	for	this	fall	was	the	regular	increase	in	LNG’s	share	in	total	gas	imports	
to	Europe	seen	in	the	second	half	of	the	2000s.	Furthermore,	a	few	other	fac-
tors	played	an	important	role:	the	slow	economic	growth	in	EU	countries,	the	
improvement	of	energy	efficiency	 in	European	countries	combined	with	the	
policy	of	diversification	of	energy	sources,	and	the	increase	in	unconventional	
gas	production,	including	shale	(mainly	USA)24.
Russian	gas	supplies	increased	in	2011	(imports	from	Africa	fell	due	to	the	Arab	
Spring)	and	 in	2013	 (164.24	bcm	 jointly	EU	with	Turkey),	which	 in	 turn	was	
mainly	an	effect	of	the	unusually	cold	winter	in	the	2012/2013	season,	a	tem-
porary	decrease	 in	supplies	 from	Norway	and	 the	redirection	of	 larger	LNG	
batches	(in	particular,	gas	from	Qatar)	to	Asian	markets.	Pessimistic	forecasts	
regarding	European	own	production	and	the	decrease	in	LNG	supplies	to	the	
European	market	over	the	past	few	years	are	viewed	in	Russia	as	an	opportu-
nity	to	regularly	increase	its	gas	supplies	to	the	EU,	both	via	the	pipeline	sys-
tem	and	in	liquefied	form.	
22	 ‘Eurogas,	 Long	 term	Outlook	 for	 Gasto	 2035’,	 October	 2013,	 http://www.eurogas.org/up-
loads/media/Eurogas_Brochure_Long-Term_Outlook_for_gas_to_2035.pdf;	World	Energy	
Outlook	2013,	page	103.	
23	 Until	1974,	the	share	of	imports	from	the	Soviet	Union	accounted	for	less	than	10%	of	total	gas	
imports	to	Europe.	In	late	1970s,	it	was	25%,	in	the	1980s	it	was	40%,	in	the	1990s	–	50%,	reach-
ing	a	record-high	level	of	60%	in	2007.	S.	V.	Zhukov	(ed.),	‘Глобализация рынка природного 
газа: возможности и вызовы для России’,	IMEMO	RAN,	Moscow	2010,	pages	68-87.	
24	 ‘Экспорт российского газа: ограничения и перспективы’, Центр макроэкономического 
анализа и краткосрочного пргнозирования,	http://www.forecast.ru/_ARCHIVE/Analit-
ics/Resources/Gas/GasTrade_13.04.24-1.pdf	(accessed	on:	12	May	2014).	
18
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 9
/2
01
4
2.2. The	evolution	of	the	gas	trade	rules
The	gas trade rules on	the	European	market	have	also	been	evolving.	Long-
term	 contracts,	with	 a	 price	 formula	 based	 on	 prices	 of	 oil	 and	 petroleum	
products,	were	the	predominant	way	of	ensuring	gas	supplies	to	Europe	in	
the	past	few	decades.	Since	oil	prices	were	high	in	2002–2008,	gas	prices	in-
creased	significantly.	As	a	consequence	of	oversupply	of	gas	seen	since	2009,	
what	 was	 the	 predominant	 indexation	 model	 started	 to	 be	 replaced	 with	
a	hybrid	model:	part	of	supplies	are	indexed	on	the	basis	of	oil	and	a	basket	
of	petroleum	products,	and	part	is	oriented	to	prices	on	spot	markets	as	part	
of	gas	hubs,	both	real	(physical)	and	virtual.	Furthermore,	short-term	con-
tracts	are	used	more	and	more	frequently	for	ensuring	gas	supplies.	A	sig-
nificant	 increase	 in	gas	 trade	on	spot	markets	has	been	seen	over	 the	past	
six	years:	from	15%	in	2008	to	over	50%	in	2013,	and	even	up	to	above	70%	in	
North-Western	Europe25.	
A	consistent	increase	in	gas	trade	as	part	of	gas	hubs	is	a	novelty	in	Europe	(in	
the	first	half	of	2013,	turnovers	as	part	of	the	three	continental	gas	hubs:	TTF	in	
Holland	and	Gaspool	and	NCG	in	Germany	grew	year-on-year	by	27%,	23%	and	
22%,	respectively)26.	The	creation	of	gas	hubs	has	also	contributed	to	the	emer-
gence	of	new	gas	exchanges	in	Europe.	Spot	contracts	and	futures	can	be	con-
tracted	on	the	key	energy	exchanges	(ICE,	APX-ENDEX,	EEX,	EPEX	Spot,NBP,	
TTF,	PEG	Nord	and	PEG	Sud,	and	NCG).	
The	ever	higher	significance	of	spot	contracts	poses	a	serious	challenge	to	Rus-
sia.	Long-term	contracts	for	gas	supply	and	transit	are	Gazprom’s	preferred	op-
tion,	since	they	usually	include	clauses	which	are	beneficial	for	it,	such	as	the	
‘take	or	pay’	clause,	which	was	a	standard	in	contracts	signed	with	European	
recipients	in	2005–201027.	
Another	challenge	for	Russia	is	the	increasing	significance	of	spot	mechanisms	
in	determining	the	price	formula	in	contracts	concluded	by	other	key	suppliers	
of	gas	to	the	EU	market.	One	example	is	Norway,	the	second	most	important	
25	 ‘Paying	 the	 piper.	 Gazprom	 and	 European	 gas	 markets’,	 The Economist,	 4	 January	 2014,	
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21592639-european-efforts-reduce-russian-
state-owned-companys-sway-over-gas-prices-have-been	(accessed	on:	10	January	2014).	
26	 Quarterly	Report	on	European	Gas	Markets,	DG	Energy,	Vol.	6,	Issue	2,	http://ec.europa.eu/en-
ergy/observatory/gas/doc/20130814_q2_quarterly_report_on_european_gas_markets.pdf	
27	 Thus	concerns	both	gas	supply	and	gas	transit	contracts.	
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exporter	of	gas	 to	 the	EU	market.	Norway	has	essentially	modified	 its	 trade	
policy;	at	present,	Statoil	supplies	almost	50%	of	gas	 to	EU	recipients	at	spot	
prices28.	
The	evolution	of	the	situation	on	the	European	gas	market,	seen	since	the	be-
ginning	of	the	new	century,	one	consequence	of	which	has	been	a	change	in	the	
contracting	practice29,	has	encouraged	Gazprom’s	key	clients	to	assume	a	more	
assertive	stance	during	negotiations	and	force	Gazprom	to	modify	its	contracts	
with	them.	The	modifications	include:	gas	price	discounts,	and	even	demands	
to	cancel	the	‘take	or	pay’	formula	in	contracts	made	by	Italy’s	ENI30.
As	a	consequence	of	the	market	changes,	European	recipients	began	using	ar-
bitration	proceedings	at	Stockholm	and	Vienna	arbitration	courts	as	a	means	of	
forcing	Gazprom	to	make	price	concessions31.	The	award	passed	by	the	Vienna	
arbitration	court	in	October	2012,	which	was	unfavourable	for	Gazprom,	has	
had	a	special	impact.	Gazprom	lost	the	suit	it	had	brought	in	September	2011	
against	 the	Czech	 company	RWE	Transgas.	Gazprom	claimed	 that	 its	Czech	
contractor	had	 to	pay	US$500	million	 for	 receiving	 less	 gas	 than	 contracted	
in	 2008–2011. This	decision	 set	 a	precedent	 –	 it	was	 the	first	 time	when	 the	
court	ruled	that	a	unilateral	waiver	of	the	‘take	or	pay’	clause	did	not	constitute	
breach	of	 contract.	One	 indirect	 consequence	of	 the	arbitration	proceedings	
is	the	reinforcement	of	European	gas	companies’	negotiating	position,	which	
insist	 that	 the	 long-term	contracts	 signed	with	Gazprom,	and	especially	 the	
provisions	concerning	the	price	policy,	need	to	be	revised.	The	unfavourable	
court	decisions	have	undermined	Gazprom’s	position	in	other	arbitration	cases	
28	 Nerijus	 Adomaitis,	 ‘Norway	 challenges	 Russia	 with	 new	 European	 gas	 pricing	 in	 Eu-
rope’,	http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/20/statoil-wintershall-idUSL5E8M-
K0W320121120	(accessed	on:	20	August	2013).	
29	 In	2003,	the	European	Commission,	Gazprom	and	ENI	settled	to	remove	market	division	
and	destination	clauses	from	gas	contracts.	In	turn,	in	2005,	destination	clauses	were	left	
out	of	Gazprom’s	contracts	with	OMV.
30	 ‘От Газпрома требуют отменить принцип Take or Pay’,	 http://news.eizvestia.com/news_
abroad/full/ot-gazproma-trebuyut-otmenit-princip-take-or-pay	(accessed	on:	25	October	2013).	
31	 For	example,	the	proceedings	initiated	in	December	2010	by	RWE	Transgas	at	the	Vienna	
arbitration	court	concerning	change	of	the	price	formula	(the	decision	passed	in	June	2013	
was	unfavourable	to	Gazprom);	the	proceedings	initiated	by	PGNiG	in	February	2012	at	the	
Stockholm	arbitration	court	 concerning	change	of	 the	price	 formula	 (the	request	 for	ar-
bitration	was	withdrawn	after	a	price	discount	was	granted	in	November	2012);	proceed-
ings	initiated	upon	request	from	Lithuania	submitted	to	the	Stockholm	arbitration	court,	
in	which	Lithuania	demanded	it	should	be	given	back	the	money	overpaid	for	Russian	gas	
in	2004–2012	(the	suit	is	likely	to	be	withdrawn	since	Lithuania	was	granted	a	discount	in	
May	2014).	
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brought	by	European	companies	and	also	in	talks	concerning	renegotiation	of	
the	 gas	 contracts	 already	 in	 force.	 In	 turn,	 the	more	 flexible	 interpretation	
of	 the	 ‘take	or	pay’	clause	–	one	of	 the	pillars	of	Gazprom’s	contract	policy	–	
adopted	by	 the	European	customers	may	make	 it	more	difficult	 for	 the	Rus-
sian	company	to	defend	its	stance	during	the	antitrust	proceedings	launched	
by	the	European	Commission	 in	September	2012	 (the	European	Commission	
is	considering	whether	the	‘take	or	pay’	clause	complies	with	EU	competition	
principles).
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II. THE RUSSIAN STRATEGy IN RESPONSE TO THE CHANGES 
TAKING PLACE ON THE EUROPEAN GAS mARKET 
One	of	the	strategic	goals	as	part	of	Russian	energy	policy	is	to	maintain,	and	
if	 possible	 reinforce,	 its	 position	 as	 a	 gas	 supplier	 to	 Europe.	 Emphasising	
more	often	than	before	the	significance	of	expansion	on	Asian	markets	and	
the	activation	 in	 the	 liquefied	natural	gas	sector	 is	an	essential	 revision	of	
this	policy.	As	a	consequence	of	this,	Russia	is	expected	to	gradually	change	
its	position	from	a	dominant	regional	supplier	(Europe)	into	that	of	a	‘rotat-
ing’	regional	producer,	capable	of	supplying	gas	not	only	to	Europe	but	also	
to	Asian	markets32.	
On	the	one	hand,	Moscow	wants	to	maintain	the	market	for	the	gas	supplied	
by	Gazprom,	and	on	the	other	to	keep	the	prices	at	a	sufficiently	high	level	to	
ensure	that	expected	profits	are	generated.	Furthermore,	the	certainty	of	im-
ports	is	viewed	as	a	guarantee	of	cost-effectiveness	of	investments	in	Russian	
gas	fields,	especially	those	located	in	the	Yamal	Peninsula	or	Eastern	Siberia,	
where	production	must	start	if	Russia	wants	to	comply	with	its	existing	and	
planned	contractual	obligations.	
The	 tools	 which	 are	 expected	 to	 help	 Russia	 achieve	 its	 strategic	 goal	 are:	
maintaining	control	of	the	transit	routes,	diversification	of	gas	export	routes	
combined	with	marginalizing	the	transit	countries’	role	and	investing	in	Eu-
ropean	assets	which	are	strictly	connected	with	the	gas	sector,	including	those	
from	the	power	sector	(it	has	declared	an	interest	in	investing	in	European	gas	
power	plants)33.	
Russia has reacted to the changes taking place on the European gas mar-
ket dichotomously: offensively and defensively. 
As	regards	offensive action, Russia	has	manifested	its	unwillingness	to	accept	
the	need	to	adjust	to	the	changing	reality,	and	has	responded	most	aggressively	
to	the	legal	and	institutional	challenges.	This	has	been	demonstrated	both	on	
the	level	of	political	rhetoric	and	in	the	legal	steps,	taken	and	announced.	Mos-
cow	is	continuing	its	efforts	to	maintain	and	ultimately	increase	its	share	in	the	
32	 Tatiana	Mitrova,	‘Russian	Gas	Supplies	to	Europe’,	the	electronic	version	of	the	presenta-
tion	made	in	Oslo	on	5	June	2013,	http://www.eriras.ru/files/Mitrova-European-Gas-Con-
ference-2013-June-5.pdf	(accessed	on:	10	November	2013).	
33	 Manfred	Hafner,	 ‘Russian	 Strategy	 on	 Infrastructure	 and	Gas	 Flows	 to	 Europe’,	 POLIN-
ARES	working	paper	no.	73,	December	2012,	page	1.	
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European	gas	market	through	the	acquisition	of	assets	which	make	it	possible	
for	it	to	gain	a	greater	share	in	gas	trade	in	the	EU.	Russia	has	also	been	con-
sistently	pushing	through	new	infrastructural	investments	aimed	at	creating	
more	opportunities	to	transport	gas	to	Europe,	thus	reducing	its	dependence	
on	the	existing	 transit	routes	 (including	the	one	running	through	Ukraine).	
The	Kremlin	has	intensified	its	efforts	to	turn	the	announced	diversification	
of	markets	for	Russian	gas	exports	(Asian	countries,	and	in	particular	China)	
into	real	action,	and	has	consistently	presented	these	as	an	alternative	to	the	
European	market.	
On	the	other	hand,	defensive action has	been	seen,	such	as:	some	economic	
decisions	and	legislation	changes	linked	to	the	operation	of	the	gas	market	
in	Russia,	and	actions	taken	as	part	of	internal	gas	policy.	All	these	are	proof	
of	 a	 certain	 evolution	 of	 the	Russian	 strategy,	 suggesting	 at	 least	 a	 partial	
adjustment	to	the	changing	market	reality	(price	discounts	for	European	gas	
recipients).	
1. The offensive actions
1.1. Criticism	of	the	legal	and	institutional	changes
Russia	has	reacted	highly	critically,	and	in	some	cases	very	emotionally,	to	the	
legal	and	institutional	changes	taking	place	on	the	European	gas	market.	Its	
sharp	rhetoric	is	accompanied	by	announcements	that	concrete	legal	steps	to	
protect	Russian	interests	will	be	taken.	
Russia	has	responded	especially	negatively	to	the	regulatory	changes	made	as	
part	of	the	liberalisation	of	the	EU	gas	market.	Critical rhetoric with regard 
to the third energy package has	been	heard	in	the	statements	of	many	Rus-
sian	senior	officials,	above	all,	Vladimir	Putin.	Both	the	conservative	members	
of	the	Russian	elite	(Sergey	Ivanov34	and	Sergey	Lavrov35)	and	those	who	are	
34	 Sergey	Ivanov	in	an	interview	for	Russia-1	TV	channel	in	December	2012	threatened	that	
the	third	energy	package	could	cause	a	decrease	in	gas	supplies	to	Europe.	Source:	http://
www.oilcapital.ru/industry/188211.html	(accessed	on:	7	July	2013).	
35	 Sergey	Lavrov	concluded	at	the	end	of	the	European	Union–Russia	summit	in	Brussels	in	
December	2012	that	the	European	Union,	by	introducing	the	requirements	of	the	third	en-
ergy	package,	had	breached	its	obligation	with	regard	to	Russia	not	to	worsen	the	condi-
tions	of	doing	business	for	Russian	companies	in	the	EU.	Source:	http://www.interfax.ru/
business/news.asp?id=282275	(accessed	on:	7	July	2013).	
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seen	as	holding	more	liberal	views	(Arkady	Dvorkovich36)	have	spoken	out	in	
this	context	in	a	sharp	tone.	Moscow	argues	in	its	official	statements	that	the	
EU	regulations	are	above	all	 anti-Russian.	Vladimir	Putin	has	 concluded	on	
numerous	occasions	that	the	main	intention	of	the	third	energy	package	is	to	
force	Russia	to	reduce	the	prices	of	gas	supplied	by	Gazprom	to	the	European	
market,	and	ultimately	to	bring	about	a	change	in	the	price	formula	used	in	gas	
contracts37.	Likewise,	the	antitrust	proceedings	launched	against	Gazprom	are	
viewed	by	the	Russian	government	and	the	company’s	management	as	an	il-
lustration	of	the	politicisation	of	energy	relations	between	Russia	and	the	EU38.	
Russia	has	also	reacted	emotionally	to	the	increasing	assertiveness	of	EU	in-
stitutions	as	regards	compliance	with	EU	law.	One	proof	of	this	was	Vladimir	
Putin’s	reaction	to	the	launch	of	the	antitrust	investigation	against	Gazprom	
by	the	European	Commission	in	September	2012.	The	Russian	president	passed	
a	special	decree	one	week	 later.	Under	 this	decree,	Russian	companies	were	
required	 to	 receive	 prior	 consent	 from	 the	 federal	 government	 of	 the	 Rus-
sian	Federation	in	three	cases:	(1)	disclosure	of	information	concerning	their	
business	upon	request	 from	authorities	of	other	 countries,	 international	or-
ganisations	and	 international	 structures	 (in	addition	 to	 the	 information	 the	
disclosure	of	which	is	provided	under	Russian	law	and	information	linked	to	
issuing	securities);	(2)	amending	contracts	concluded	by	strategic	companies	
(including	price	changes);	(3)	sale	of	foreign	assets	owned	by	Russian	strategic	
companies.	
President	Putin’s	 reaction	 in	 the	 form	of	a	 legal	measure	 in	 fact	 turned	 into	
a	political	demonstration	which	was	intended	as	a	symmetric	response	to	the	
European	Commission’s	decision.	The	Kremlin	saw	the	launch	of	the	antitrust	
proceedings	as	a	move	motivated	by	strictly	political	reasons	and	an	attempt	
from	Brussels	to	force	Russia	to	reduce	the	prices	of	gas	supplied	to	Europe	and	
thus	protect	the	interests	of	EU	member	states.	
36	 Arkady	Dvorkovich	emphasised	in	an	interview	on	22	November	2012	that	if	the	new	EU	
regulations	gave	rise	to	a	higher	business	risk,	Gazprom	could	reduce	the	supplies,	which	
would	inevitably	lead	to	a	rise	in	gas	prices	in	Europe.	Source:	http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/2072892	(accessed	on:	8	July	2013).	
37	 Vladimir	Putin,	‘Россия и меняющийся мир’,	Московские новости,	27	February	2012.	
38	 ‘В “Газпроме” считают расследование ЕК против него попыткой давления’, http://
ria.ru/economy/20130530/940329650.html	 (accessed	 on:	 8	 May	 2014);	 ‘Путин назвал 
антимонопольное расследование «Газпрома» Европейской комиссией «прискорбным»’,	
http://novostiua.net/russia/17884-putin-nazval-antimonopolnoe-rassledovanie-gazpro-
ma-evropeyskoy-komissiey-priskorbnym.html	(accessed	on:	8	May	2014).	
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The	 decree	 did	 not	 prevent	 the	 European	 Commission	 from	 continuing	 the	
proceedings.	However,	the	fact	that	it	was	passed	revealed	Gazprom’s	lack	of	
readiness	 to	 co-operate	with	 representatives	 of	 this	 EU	 institution	 and	 po-
tentially	increased	the	likelihood	that	the	decision	would	be	unfavourable	for	
Gazprom39.	In	the	context	of	the	antitrust	proceedings,	Russia	has	on	the	one	
hand	manifested	readiness	 to	make	concessions,	one	proof	of	which	are	 the	
declarations	made	by	Gazprom’s	deputy	head,	Alexander	Medvedev,	made	in	
early	December	 2013	 in	Brussels40.	On	 the	 other	hand,	 it	 is	 conceivable	 that	
Gazprom	is	making	preparations	for	a	legal	confrontation,	considering	the	fact	
that	the	proposed	changes	in	the	trade	policy	with	regard	to	Eastern	and	Cen-
tral	European	countries	it	made	in	December	2013	were	not	fully	satisfactory	to	
the	Directorate-General	for	Competition41.	
Russia	has	also	employed	traditional	political	measures	as	part	of	its	efforts	to	
counteract	the	consequences	of	the	regulatory	changes.	One	proof	of	this	was	
the	Russian	proposal	to	reach	a	special	agreement	with	the	European	Union	that	
would	comprehensively	regulate	all	contested	issues	concerning	energy	co-op-
eration.	The	draft	agreement	to	this	effect	was	sent	to	Brussels	twice	in	2012.	
Russia	has	also	made	attempts	to	maintain	close	energy	co-operation	with	se-
lected	EU	member	 states	 (agreements	 concerning	 the	 construction	of	 South	
Stream	 signed	with	 Bulgaria,	Hungary,	 Slovenia,	 Austria,	 Italy	 and	Greece;	
and	developing	co-operation	in	the	area	of	nuclear	energy,	mainly	with	Hun-
gary,	but	also	with	the	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	Bulgaria).	By	intensifying	
bilateral	contacts,	Russia	has	been	trying	to	make	it	more	difficult	for	the	Euro-
pean	Commission	to	take	cohesive	action	on	behalf	of	EU	member	states,	thus	
weakening	Brussels’	position	in	negotiations	with	Moscow.	
Another	 political	measure	 in	 regular	 use	 is	making	 unilateral	 declarations	
suggesting	 that	 Russia	 is	 interested	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 previously	
39	 Szymon	Kardaś,	 ‘Vladimir	Putin	 issues	 a	 decree	 ‘in	defence’	 of	Gazprom’,	OSW Analyses,	
12	September	2012,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-09-12/vladimir-
putin-issues-a-decree-defence-gazprom	
40	 ‘EU	says	Gazprom	offers	to	settle	antitrust	dispute’,	http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/04/
eu-gazprom-antitrust-idUKL5N0JJ3UU20131204	(accessed	on:	4	December	2013).	
41	 According	 to	a	statement	made	by	 the	European	Commissioner	 for	Competition,	 Joaquín	
Almunia,	Gazprom	has	not	made	the	expected	proposals	in	connection	with	the	accusation	
concerning	offering	unfair	prices	to	gas	recipients	in	Central	and	Eastern	European	coun-
tries.	‘Gazprom	fails	to	satisfy	EU	in	anti-trust	case’,	http://euobserver.com/tickers/123052	
(accessed	on:	10	February	2014).	
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considered	energy	projects.	One	example	of	this	was	President	Putin’s	appeal	
in	April	2013	to	the	president	of	Gazprom,	Alexey	Miller,	in	which	he	pointed	
out	 the	need	 to	revive	 the	project	envisaging	 the	construction	of	 the	second	
branch	of	the	Yamal-Europe	gas	pipeline42.	Such	moves	are	aimed	primarily	
at	provoking	political	discussions	in	the	countries	which	the	projects	concern	
and	 at	 creating	 a	 sort	 of	 information	 noise	which	 stresses	 the	 difference	 of	
opinions	between	individual	EU	member	states.	
1.2. Investments	in	the	gas	storage	and	trade	segment
Another	constant	element	in	Gazprom’s	strategy	is	the	desire to reinforce its 
position on the EU gas market through supplies to individual customers. 
Therefore,	Gazprom	has	been	consistently	investing	in	assets	in	the	gas	storage	
and	sale	segment	of	the	EU	market.	Russia’s	transactions	are	usually	based	on	
the	asset	swap	mechanism.	One	example	is	the	deal	struck	by	Germany’s	Win-
tershall	and	Gazprom	on	14	November	2012.	As	part	of	this	transaction,	Winter-
shall,	a	subsidiary	of	BASF,	will	receive	25%	plus	one	share	in	blocks	IV	and	V	of	
the	Achimov	fields	(Urengoy)	in	Western	Siberia,	whose	estimated	gas	reserves	
are	274	bcm.	Additionally,	Wintershall	will	have	the	opportunity	to	increase	its	
share	in	both	blocks	to	50%;	and	gas	production	is	expected	to	commence	there	
in	2016.	In	exchange	for	this,	Gazprom	will	have	exclusive	control	over	the	gas	
trade	and	storage	companies	which	it	co-controlled	with	Wintershall	until	re-
cently:	Wingas	GmbH	(Wingas)	and	Wintershall	Erdgas	Handelshaus	GmbH	&	
Co.	KG	(WIEH),	and	shared	control	over	Wintershall	Noordzee	BV	(WINZ)	and	
Wintershall	Services	BV,	 the	 two	companies	whose	sole	owner	 is	Wintershall	
and	which	are	involved	on	a	relatively	small	scale	in	exploration	and	production	
of	crude	oil	and	natural	gas	in	the	North	Sea.	Gazprom	will	also	take	full	control	
over	the	OPAL	gas	pipeline,	owned	by	Wingas,	under	this	deal.	
Gazprom	 was	 interested	 in	 buying	 the	 Greek	 state-owned	 company	 DEPA43,	
and	its	unexpected	withdrawal	from	the	deal	in	June	2013	can	be	interpreted	as	
resulting	from	the	concern	that	the	European	Commission	will	not	accept	the	
transaction	due	to	potential	non-compliance	with	regulations	on	counteracting	
42	 In	 the	variant	with	a	so-called	peremychka, i.e.	an	 intersystem	connection	running	 from	
Belarus	via	Poland	to	Slovakia.	
43	 Gazprom	is	interested	in	this;	one	proof	of	this	is	the	large	number	of	negotiation	rounds	in	
which	the	president	of	Gazprom,	Alexey	Miller,	and	the	prime	minister	of	Greece,	Antonis	
Samaras,	have	participated.	Gazprom	allocated	around	900	million	euros	for	the	purchase	
of	DEPA.	
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excessive	concentration	of	assets	and	the	rules	of	the	third	energy	package.	Fur-
thermore,	 it	 is	conceivable	that	Gazprom’s	withdrawal	 from	this	privatisation	
was	an	element	of	an	informal	deal	with	Azerbaijan.	In	June	2013,	SOCAR	as	part	
of	the	privatisation	process	won	the	tender	for	taking	over	DESFA,	the	Greek	gas	
operator,	and	at	the	same	time	made	a	decision	concerning	the	route	of	the	gas	
pipeline	to	be	constructed	as	part	of	the	EU	Southern	Corridor;	by	choosing	the	
TAP/TANAP	option	instead	of	Nabucco,	it	thus	refrained	from	competing	for	the	
markets	on	which	Russia	wants	to	sell	its	gas	from	the	South	Stream	pipeline.	
The	successfulness	of	Gazprom’s	strategy	is	proven	by	data	illustrating	the	in-
crease	in	its	gas	storage	capacity	in	the	EU.	In	2006–2010,	Gazprom’s	gas	stor-
age	capacity	rose	from	1.4	bcm	to	2.6	bcm,	to	reach	almost	double	the	level,	i.e.	
4.51	bcm	in	2010–2013.	This	was	achieved	through	buying	assets,	the	construc-
tion	of	new	storage	facilities	and	renting	tanks	owned	by	EU	firms.	At	present,	
Gazprom	 uses	 European	 gas	 storage	 facilities	 located	 in	 Austria,	 Germany,	
France,	the	United	Kingdom	and	Latvia.	In	2014,	it	is	also	planning	to	complete	
the	construction	of	a	gas	storage	facility	in	Bergemeer,	Holland;	its	total	capac-
ity	will	be	around	4.1	bcm.	In	turn,	a	gas	storage	facility	is	planned	to	be	put	
into	operation	in	2016	in	Damborice,	Czech	Republic.	
Table 4.	Gas	storage	facilities	in	the	EU	used	by	Gazprom44	
Country Storage facility Capacity (bcm) Gazprom’s share
Austria Haidach 4.3
33.3%	shares	(the	right	
to	use	1.7	bcm)
Czech	
Republic
Damborice 0.456	(in	2018) 50%	shares
Holland Bergemeer45 4.146
42%	shares	(the	right	
to	use	1.9	bcm)
44	 In	 addition	 to	 gas	 storage	 facilities	 in	 EU	 countries,	 Gazprom	 also	 has	 one	 in	 Banatski	
Dvor,	 Serbia.	 This	 gas	 storage	 has	 a	 capacity	 of	 around	 0.45	 billion	m3,	 and	 is	 51%	 con-
trolled	by	Gazprom.	 ‘Газпром удвоит мощности по хранению газа в Европе’,	http://rbc-
daily.ru/industry/562949980275426	(accessed	on	20	March	2014); ‘Газпром запустил под 
Калининградом крупного «конкурента» латвийского газохранилища’; http://www.
gorod.lv/novosti/206261-gazprom-zapustil-pod-kaliningradom-krupnogo-konkurenta-
latviiskogo-gazohranilischa	(accessed	on:	20	March	2014).	
45	 It	is	expected	to	be	put	into	operation	in	2014.
46	 The	full	storage	capacity	will	be	reached	in	2015.
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Country Storage facility Capacity (bcm) Gazprom’s share
Latvia Incukalns 4.47	 actually	in	use	2.32	bcm
Germany
Etzel
Rehden
Jemgum
Katarina
1.2
4.4	
1.2
0.629
33.3%	shares
100%	shares
100%	shares
50%	shares
United	
Kingdom
Humbly	Grove
Saltfleetby
0.254
0.750
100%	shares	
100%	shares
Author’s	calculations	based	on	data	published	by	Gas	Infrastructure	Europe	and	the	official	website	
of	Gazprom	
Without	relinquishing	the	price	formula	used	thus	far	in	long-term	contracts	
(according	to	sources	linked	to	Gazprom,	the	share	of	spot	prices	in	the	con-
tracts	currently	in	force	is	around	7%,	although	this	share	in	the	price	formula	
is	higher	 in	some	contracts),	Gazprom	will	make	 further	attempts	at	 taking	
over	assets	that	enable	gas	supplies	to	individual	customers	(as	was	the	case	
with	the	assets	exchange	deal	with	Germany’s	BASF),	thus	capitalising	on	the	
opportunity	to	sell	gas	as	part	of	transactions	effected	on	gas	exchanges.	Fur-
thermore,	while	 in	 2009	 the	price	 in	Gazprom’s	 long-term	contracts	was	on	
average	around	70%	higher	 than	 the	 spot	market	prices,	 in	 2013	 it	was	only	
5–6%	higher.	 In	the	opinion	of	Howard	Rogers	 from	Oxford	Institute	 for	En-
ergy	Studies,	Gazprom	could	influence	the	prices	by	increasing	its	share	in	the	
spot	market47.	Therefore,	it	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	investments	in	gas	storage	
infrastructure	 (especially	 in	Germany)	and	 interest	 in	buying	shares	 in	gas	
hubs48	signify	Gazprom’s	further	activity	in	the	European	spot	markets.	One	
sign	of	this	could	also	be	Gazprom’s	declared	interest	in	reinforcing	its	position	
in	the	highly	liberalised	British	market.	
47	 ‘Paying	 the	 piper.	 Gazprom	 and	 European	 gas	 markets’,	 The Economist,	 4	 January	 2014,	
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21592639-european-efforts-reduce-russian-
state-owned-companys-sway-over-gas-prices-have-been	(accessed	on:	10	January	2014).	
48	 The	most	serious	and	unsuccessful	attempt	to	acquire	shares	in	a	major	gas	hub	concerned	
the	Baumgarten	hub	in	Austria.	The	deal	was	blocked	by	the	European	Commission	in	2011	
as	part	of	ownership	concentration	prevention	procedure.	
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1.3. The	pipeline	expansion
One	of	the	measures	used	by	Russia	to	maintain	and	even	strengthen	its	posi-
tion	on	the	European	market	is	increasing the transport capacity by build-
ing new pipelines which	are	intended	to	contribute	to	boosting	Russian	gas	
supplies	to	the	European	market.	The	expected	growth	in	demand	for	gas	in	
Europe	has	been	used	as	an	official	reason	for	this.	According	to	Gazprom’s	es-
timates,	in	2020	demand	will	rise	by	around	80	bcm,	and	in	2030	in	aggregate	
by	around	200	bcm	in	comparison	to	201349.	
The	construction	of	 the	South	Stream	gas	pipeline,	which	was	officially	
inaugurated	on	7	December	2012,	is	a	priority	project	for	Russia.	The	new	
pipeline	consisting	of	four	branches,	with	a	planned	target	capacity	of	63	
bcm,	will	run	through	the	Black	Sea,	Bulgaria,	Serbia,	Hungary	and	Slo-
venia	to	Italy,	with	branches	going	to	Croatia,	Macedonia	and	Bosnia	and	
Herzegovina.	 Austria	 recently	 declared	 once	 again	 its	 intention	 to	 join	
the	 project.	 The	 representatives	 of	 Gazprom	 and	 Austria’s	 OMV	 signed	
a	memorandum	to	this	effect	on	29	April	2014	in	Moscow,	and	sharehold-
ers	 of	 South	Stream	Austria	GmbH	 signed	 an	 agreement	 envisaging	 the	
construction	of	 the	Austrian	section	of	South	Stream	on	24	 June	2014	 in	
Vienna50.	The	management	of	Gazprom	are	still	interested	in	the	further	
development	of	the	Nord	Stream	gas	pipeline,	declaring	that	its	possible	
third	 and	 fourth	 branches	 could	 be	used	primarily	 for	 supplying	 gas	 to	
the	British	market.	
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 analysis	 of	 gas	 supplies	 contracted	 and	 the	 existing	
available	 transport	 capacities	 suggests	 that	 the	Russian	policy	 is	 economi-
cally	 irrational.	However,	 in	 the	 longer	 run,	 increasing	 transport	 capacity	
may	constitute	a	successful	means	for	partially	resolving	the	legal	problems	
existing	in	Russia-EU	relations.	This	may	also	enable	Russia	to	influence	the	
49	 Elena	Khodiakova, ‘Газпром снизит цены на газ ради увеличения экспорта’, Ведомости,	
5	June	2013.	
50	 According	to	official	information,	the	Austrian	section	of	South	Stream,	with	a	terminal	in	
Baumgarten,	is	expected	to	come	into	operation	in	2017,	and	will	make	it	possible	to	trans-
mit	up	 to	32	bcm	of	Russian	gas	annually	 (a	 transport	capacity	at	 this	 level	 is	planned	 to	
be	achieved	 in	 January	2018).	 ‘«Газпром» и Австрия отметили актуальность создания 
альтернативных маршрутов поставок российского газа в Европу’,	http://www.gazprom.
ru/press/news/2014/april/article189329/	 (accessed	 on:	 26	 April	 2014);	 ‘„Южный поток” 
возвращается в Австрию’,	http://www.gazprom.ru/press/news/2014/april/article189898/	
(accessed	on:	29	April	2014);	‘OMV	sees	South	Stream	return’,	Argus FSUE,	1	May	2014,	page	5.	
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level	of	gas	prices	on	the	European	spot	markets	and	serve	as	an	instrument	
for	achieving	its	political	goals.	
The	Russian	pipeline	policy	may	 turn	out	successful	 in	 the	context	of	coun-
teracting	some	of	the	consequences	of	the	implementation	of	the	third	energy	
package.	By	intensifying	the	use	of	the	existing	branches	of	Nord	Stream	or	
developing	 it,	Gazprom	might	avoid	problems	resulting	 from	the	need	to	re-
serve	transport	capacity	in	the	transit	countries	(in	particular,	in	the	case	of	
gas	transported	via	Ukraine).	The	new	networks	would	offer	it	greater	flexibil-
ity	in	the	context	of	a	possible	redirection	of	gas	supplies	to	Europe51,	and	ulti-
mately	an	instrument	for	manipulating	the	European	gas	market	(the	multi-
tude	of	available	options	for	gas	supply	to	Europe	will	allow	it,	as	the	need	may	
arise,	 to	decrease	or	 increase	supplies	on	the	spot	markets,	 thus	 influencing	
gas	prices)52.	However,	whether	it	will	be	able	to	achieve	this	goal	will	depend	
on	the	European	Commission’s	consent	to	the	complete53	exclusion	of	the	OPAL	
gas	pipeline	(together	with	the	NEL	pipeline,	it	forms	the	onshore	extension	
of	Nord	Stream)	from	the	rules	of	the	third	energy	package,	and	especially	the	
third-party	access	rule54,	as	requested	by	Gazprom.	
The	new	pipelines	will	also	be	used	to	torpedo	the	plans	to	build	alternative	(to	
Russian)	transmission	networks.	The	proposal	to	build	South	Stream	was	cor-
rectly	seen	as	Moscow’s	response	to	the	project	envisaging	the	construction	of	
the	Nabucco	gas	pipeline	via	which	Azerbaijani	(and	potentially	even	Iranian)	
gas	could	have	been	supplied	to	Europe,	which	was	announced	in	2003.	Thus	
Azerbaijan’s	support	for	the	construction	of	the	TAP	and	TANAP	gas	pipelines	
is	beneficial	to	Russia;	since	these	pipelines	will	constitute	only	partial	compe-
tition	to	its	South	Stream	project.	At	the	same	time,	it	enables	Russia	to	be	more	
51	 The	deputy	president	 of	Gazprom,	Alexander	Medvedev,	 announced	on	 2	March	2014	 in	
London	that	 the	company	 intended	to	reduce	 the	 transit	of	Russian	gas	via	Ukraine	 this	
year	to	70	bcm	(from	the	level	of	86.1	bcm	in	2013).	‘Ukraine	transit	cut	expected’,	Argus FSU 
Energy,	vol.	XIX,	9,	6	March	2014,	page	13.	
52	 Sadek	Boussena,	Catherine	Locatelli,	‘Energy	institutional	and	organizational	changes	in	EU	
and	Russia.	Revisiting	gas	relations’,	Economie Du Developpment Durable et De l’Energie,	Octobre	
2012,	http://lepii.upmf-grenoble.fr/IMG/pdf/CR17-2012_energy-institutional_SB-CL.pdf	
53	 At	present,	Gazprom	can	use	50%	of	this	pipeline’s	capacity.	
54	 The	German	regulator	passed	a	decision	which	was	favourable	to	Gazprom	on	18	November	
2013.	The	motion	was	then	notified	to	the	European	Commission,	which	was	to	make	a	deci-
sion	concerning	this	issue	by	10	March	2014	–	on	that	day	the	European	Commission	issued	
a	statement	that	the	deadline	for	the	decision	was	postponed.	On	16	July	2014,	the	European	
Commission	again	postponed	its	decision	to	this	effect	sine	die.	The	Russian	ministry	for	
energy	has	announced	that	it	expects	the	decision	to	be	taken	in	mid	September	2014.	
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flexible	in	deciding	on	the	final	shape	of	South	Stream55.	In	turn,	the	continued	
interest	in	developing	Nord	Stream	can	be	viewed	as	a	response	to	the	inten-
sification	of	EU	countries’	efforts	(especially	in	the	Baltic	Sea	region)	aimed	at	
developing	LNG	terminals.	
Moscow	has	used	the	implementation	of	pipeline	projects	in	co-operation	with	
selected	EU	member	states	as	a	means	of	strengthening	its	political	influence	
in	Europe.	One	proof	of	this	is	in	Russia’s	relations	with	the	countries	engaged	
in	the	construction	of	the	South	Stream	pipeline,	especially	with	Hungary.	By	
demonstrating	warm	political	relations	with	Budapest	and	offering	it	favour-
able	conditions	for	economic	co-operation	(not	only	in	the	gas	sector	but	also	
in	the	nuclear	sector)	Moscow	is	presenting	itself	as	an	appealing	partner	who	
can	grant	support	to	those	EU	member	states,	especially	in	Central	and	East-
ern	Europe,	which	are	 in	 conflict	with	 the	European	Commission	and	some	
EU	member	states.	Another	factor	which	brings	the	two	countries	closer	is	the	
attachment	to	conservative	values	manifested	by	their	leaders;	and	this	fits	in	
with	the	trends	in	domestic	and	foreign	policy	set	by	the	Kremlin56.	The	readi-
ness	to	enhance	relations	with	Russia	shown	by	the	countries	engaged	in	South	
Stream	is	making	it	easier	for	Moscow	to	pursue	its	policy	based	on	breaking	
the	unity	of	EU	countries.	One	direct	effect	of	this	policy,	which	is	beneficial	to	
Russia,	is	the	fact	that	Brussels	is	unable	to	adopt	a	fully	cohesive	policy	with	
regard	to	Moscow.	The	lack	of	a	common	stance	in	the	EU	on	the	imposition	of	
really	painful	sanctions	on	Russia	in	connection	with	the	Ukrainian	crisis	was	
just	one	example	of	this.	
1.4. The	diversification	of	the	directions	in	Russian	gas	exports
Given	the	mounting	regulatory	challenges	on	the	European	market,	represent-
atives	of	Gazprom	have	announced	they	would	continue	efforts	to	diversify	ex-
port	markets.	They	have	declared	that	the	rapidly	developing	Asian	markets,	
and	especially	the	Chinese	market,	could	became	an	alternative	to	Europe.	The	
determination	manifested	by	Vladimir	Putin,	who	views	 the	energy	expan-
sion	 in	Asia	not	only	 in	 economic	but	also	 in	geopolitical	 terms,	has	a	great	
impact	on	the	effectiveness	of	the	implementation	of	the	Eastern	projects.	
55	 Judy	Dempsey,	‘Victory	for	Russia	As	the	EU’s	Nabucco	Gas	Project	Collapses’,	Carnegie	Europe,	
1	July	2013,	http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=52246	(accessed	on:	10	September	2013).	
56	 Szymon	Kardaś,	Andrzej	Sadecki,	 ‘Russian-Hungarian	nuclear	agreement’	OSW Analyses,	
15	January	2014,		http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-01-15/russian-hun-
garian-nuclear-agreement	
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The	signing	of	the	Russian-Chinese	gas	contract	in	Shanghai	on	21	May	2014	
-	after	more	than	ten	years	of	negotiations57	-	represents	what	is	in	fact	only	
a	moderate	success	on	the	part	of	Gazprom.	Firstly,	the	volume	of	supplies	en-
visaged	under	the	contract	(38	bcm	as	the	ultimate	level)	is	incomparable	to	the	
exports	to	the	European	market	(EU	and	Turkey	-	164.24	bcm	in	2013).	Although	
the	significance	of	the	Chinese	market	may	increase	if	Russian	LNG	projects	
are	carried	out	(additionally	around	40	bcm	of	gas	in	the	optimal	version	and	
around	82	bcm	in	the	most	optimistic	scenario),	but	this	would	require	accel-
eration	of	work	and	obtaining	guarantees	 for	 the	 investments	 to	 enable	 the	
projects	to	reach	maximum	capacities,	which	appears	to	be	quite	unrealistic	
now.	Given	the	aforementioned	facts,	it	is	difficult	to	treat	the	expansion	of	gas	
supply	to	Asia	as	a	genuine	alternative	to	Europe;	the	European	market	will	
remain	the	key	outlet	for	Russian	gas	exported	via	pipelines.	
Secondly,	Russia	may	also	find	it	difficult	to	gain	the	expected	market	position	
in	China	or	other	Asian	countries.	While	in	Europe	Russia	already	has	a	well-
established	position	as	a	gas	supplier	resulting	from	decades	of	co-operation,	
it	will	have	to	fight	for	an	equivalent	status	on	the	Chinese	market	(or	other	
Asian	markets)	and	face	bitter	competition	with	such	major	exporters	of	lique-
fied	natural	gas	as	Australia,	Qatar	and	possibly	also	with	the	USA	within	a	few	
years’	time.	Thirdly,	this	contract	is	important	for	Russia	mainly	for	political	
reasons.	The	future	diversification	of	gas	export	routes	will	be	used	by	Russia	
as	an	instrument	during	negotiations	with	the	EU.	However,	since	it	is	impos-
sible	for	gas	supplies	to	be	rerouted	from	Europe	to	Asia,	the	effectiveness	of	
this	instrument	appears	to	be	limited.	
1.5. Torpedoing	the	plans	for	shale	gas	extraction	in	the	EU
Seeing	 the	attempts	 taken	by	some	EU	countries	 to	 implement	shale	gas	ex-
traction	 plans	 and	 thus	 improve	 their	 independence	 in	 the	 energy	 sector,	
Russia	has	become	engaged	in	‘anti-shale’	lobbying,	employing	both	economic	
57	 First	of	all,	it	is	unclear	whether	this	contract	will	bring	Gazprom	expected	long-term	eco-
nomic	benefits.	The	gas	price	ranging	between	US$350	and	US$390	per	1000	m3,	given	the	
high	costs	of	 the	field	operation	and	the	development	of	production	and	transport	 infra-
structure	may	mean	that	the	supplies	will	be	made	on	the	verge	of	profitability.	The	Shang-
hai	contract	have	not	definitely	closed	the	negotiation	process,	since	no	binding	agreement	
on	the	gas	pipeline	construction	has	been	signed	and	not	all	financial	aspects	of	this	pro-
jects	have	been	arranged	as	yet.	For	more,	see:	Szymon	Kardaś,	‘The	eastern	‘partnership	
of	gas:	Gazprom	and	CNPC	strike	a	deal	on	gas	supplies	to	China’,	OSW Commentary,	16	June	
2014,		http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_139_1.pdf
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(overly	high	production	costs,	lesser	competitiveness	of	shale	gas	as	compared	
to	gas	purchased	 from	conventional	 sources)	and	environmental	arguments	
(claiming	 that	 the	use	of	 the	hydraulic	 fracturing	method	will	have	a	major	
detrimental	 impact	 on	 the	natural	 environment).	This	has	 been	manifested	
through	both	the	official	documentation	of	Gazprom	(resolutions	by	the	board	
of	directors	and	annual	statements	on	the	company’s	operation)	and	through	
public	announcements	by	its	management	(for	example,	the	open	letter	pub-
lished	by	the	deputy	president	of	Gazprom,	Alexander	Medvedev	in	the	Polish	
daily	newspaper	Gazeta Wyborcza	in	February	2014).	
Russia	is	also	engaged	–	usually	via	its	European	business	partners,	hired	con-
sulting	firms	or	political	forces	from	EU	countries	which	are	favourably	disposed	
to	Moscow	–	in	intensive	lobbying	against	shale	gas	extraction	in	EU	member	
states.	One	proof	of	this	has	been	the	informal	support	granted	by	Russia	to	the	
anti-shale	campaign	in	Bulgaria.	As	a	result,	Bulgaria	passed	a	law	in	January	
2012	imposing	a	complete	ban	on	the	use	of	hydraulic	fracturing	technologies	for	
exploration	and	production	of	shale	gas	and	oil58.	The	Socialist	Party	(which	is	
traditionally	favourably	disposed	to	Russia)	played	a	key	role	in	passing	this	law,	
and	the	protest	campaigns	preceding	the	passing	of	this	law	were	most	likely	in-
spired	by	the	OverGas	firm,	a	Bulgarian	trade	partner	of	Gazprom59.	Another	ex-
ample	is	the	activity	of	the	lobbying	firm	GPlus	Europe,	with	which	GazpromEx-
port	has	co-operated	since	2007.	This	firm’s	official	task	is	to	improve	Gazprom’s	
image.	 However,	 the	media	 have	 suggested	 on	 numerous	 occasions	 that	 it	 is	
also	engaged	in	intensive	lobbying	for	the	Russian	company,	and	in	particular	
against	initiatives	which	could	put	at	stake	Gazprom’s	position	in	the	EU	(shale	
gas	projects	and	the	construction	of	LNG	terminals	in	countries	heavily	depend-
ent	on	Russian	gas	supplies)60.	European	energy	companies	are	also	becoming	
Gazprom’s	‘allies’	in	the	anti-shale	campaign.	The	intensive	gas	co-operation	of	
German	and	French	companies	with	Gazprom	is	one	of	the	major	factors	which	
contribute	to	blocking	legal	solutions	that	would	enable	the	implementation	of	
shale	projects	in	France	and	Germany61.	
58	 For	more,	see:	Tomasz	Dąborowski,	‘Bulgaria	is	no	longer	interested	in	shale	gas’,	EastWeek,	
25	 January	2012,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-01-25/bulgaria-no-
longer-interested-shale-gas
59	 John	 Daly,	 ‘Russia	 Behind	 Bulgarian	 Anti-Fracking	 Protests?’,	 4	 February	 2012,	 http://
oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Russia-Behind-Bulgarian-Anti-Fracking-Protests.
html	(accessed	on:	10	May	2014).
60	 Robert	 Zubrin,	 ‘Putin’s	 Anti-Fracking	 Campaign’,	 5	 May	 2014,	 http://www.nationalreview.	
com/article/377201/putins-anti-fracking-campaign-robert-zubrin	(accessed	on:	12	May	2014).	
61	 Keith	C.	Smith,	‘Unconventional	Gas	and	European	Security:	Politics	and	Foreign	Policy	of	
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2. The defensive actions
2.1. Changes	in	the	Russian	gas	sector
The	changes	in	regional	gas	markets,	including	those	seen	over	the	past	few	
years	in	the	EU,	have	triggered	a	certain	evolution	in	the	Russian	government’s	
approach	towards	issues	regarding	the	organisation	of	their	domestic	gas	sec-
tor.	President	elect	Vladimir	Putin	stated	during	a	session	of	the	State	Duma	
(Russian	parliament)	in	April	2012	that	the	changes	on	the	global	markets,	and	
in	particular	the	shale	revolution	in	the	USA	(an	upsurge	in	shale	gas	output	
from	81	bcm	in	2008	to	240	bcm	in	2012)	could	change	the	global	energy	market,	
and	these	new	challenges	needed	to	be	addressed	by	Russian	energy	firms62.	
Putin	has	 spoken	 in	a	 similar	 spirit	during	 the	meetings	of	 the	presidential	
Commission	for	Strategic	Development	of	the	Fuel	and	Energy	Sector	and	En-
vironmental	Security.	Russia	became	concerned	not	only	because	of	hurt	am-
bition	(the	hard	to	accept	loss	of	status	as	the	world’s	largest	gas	power	due	to	
the	shale	revolution	in	the	USA)	but	also	for	strictly	economic	reasons	(the	fall	
in	gas	exports	to	Europe)63.	
The	evolution	of	the	Russian	approach	has	been	signified	for	example	by	the	
restrictions	imposed	on	Gazprom’s	export	monopoly	and	plans	for	further	lib-
eralisation	of	the	Russian	gas	market,	which	also	provide	for	the	restructuring	
of	Gazprom.	
The	liberalisation	of	gas	export	rules	regarding	LNG	came	into	effect	on	1	De-
cember	2013,	mainly	owing	to	intensive	lobbying	from	Gazprom’s	competitors:	
Rosneft	and	Novatek64.	Notwithstanding	 the	 individual	 interests	of	 these	 two	
companies,	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	Vladimir	Putin	backed	this	concept	was	
the	rapid	development	of	the	LNG	market	on	both	a	global	and	regional	scale,	
including	in	Europe,	which	Russia	views	as	its	strategic	market.	While	initially	
the	liberalisation	was	intended	to	cover	only	the	LNG	exported	to	South-Eastern	
Fracking	in	Europe’,	Centre	for	Strategic	and	International	Studies,	http://www.usubc.org/
site/files/Unconventional_Gas_and_European_Security.pdf	(accessed	on:	8	May	2014).	
62	 Javier	Blas,	‘Russia	faces	challenge	to	gas	supremacy’,	Financial Times,	17	April	2012.	
63	 The	stenographic	records	of	the	commission’s	meetings	are	published	on	the	official	website	
of	 the	 President	 of	 the	Russian	 Federation:	 http://state.kremlin.ru/commission/29/news	
(accessed	on:	13	December	2014).	
64	 For	more	on	the	regulation	itself	and	its	consequences,	see:	Szymon	Kardaś,	‘A	feigned	lib-
eralisation:	Russia	is	restricting	Gazprom’s	monopoly	on	exports’,	OSW Commentary,	28	No-
vember	2013,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_121_0.pdf
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Asia,	 the	decision	was	ultimately	made	not	 to	 impose	any	geographic	 restric-
tions,	and	thus	the	way	to	exporting	LNG	to	the	EU	market	was	opened.	
The	suggestion	to	deepen	the	process	of	liberalisation	of	the	Russian	gas	mar-
ket	is	heard	more	and	more	often	in	public	discussions,	both	within	the	sector65	
and	among	government	circles66.	The	CEO	of	Rosneft,	Igor	Sechin,	appealed	for	
the	 right	 to	export	gas	via	 the	pipeline	 system	 to	 the	 so-called	 independent	
producers	 (the	dominant	 companies	being	Novatek	and	Rosneft)	during	 the	
meeting	of	the	presidential	Commission	for	Strategic	Development	of	the	Fuel	
and	Energy	Sector	and	Environmental	Security	on	4	June	in	Astrakhan,	which	
was	attended	by	Vladimir	Putin.	This	proposal	concerned	the	output	of	the	gas	
fields	located	in	Eastern	Siberia	and	the	Far	East	to	be	sold	to	South-Eastern	
Asian	markets	(in	particular,	to	China).	Vladimir	Putin,	who	had	previously	
criticised	the	idea	of	demonopolisation	of	gas	exports	via	the	pipeline	system	on	
numerous	occasions	(at	present,	this	right	is	vested	only	in	Gazprom),	did	not	
express	his	open	objection	this	time,	which	should	be	interpreted	as	a	change	
in	his	stance;	and	this	practically	presupposes	 that	Sechin’s	 idea	will	be	put	
into	practice.	The	amendments	to	the	Main	Statements	of	the	Energy	Strategy	
of	Russia	for	the	period	up	to	2035	published	on	23	January	2014	on	the	website	
of	the	Ministry	of	Energy	of	the	Russian	Federation67	is	another	sign	indicating	
65	 In	January	2014,	ITAR-TASS	agency	published	a	report	on	its	website	suggesting	that	Ros-
neft	had	put	 forward	a	motion	 for	 a	deepened	demonopolisation	of	 the	gas	 sector	 to	 the	
government	of	the	Russian	Federation.	In	its	first	stage,	the	domestic	and	export	gas	prices	
would	be	gradually	aligned,	and	all	Russian	gas	firms	would	be	granted	equal	access	to	the	
gas	pipeline	network	and	would	be	allowed	to	export	gas	using	the	pipeline	system	as	a	pi-
lot	project.	Establishing	a	separate	–	in	organisational	and	legal	terms	–	entity	that	will	be	
put	in	charge	of	managing	the	gas	transport	infrastructure	would	be	a	key	element	of	the	
second	stage.	A	state-controlled	company	would	ensure	fair	access	to	the	gas	network	to	
all	participants	of	the	Russian	market.	The	second	stage	would	also	cover	further	develop-
ment	of	the	gas	trade	system	using	the	exchange	mechanism	and	vesting	all	market	partici-
pants	with	the	right	to	export	gas	using	the	pipeline	system.	‘Роснефть предложила план 
отмены монополии Газпрома на экспорт газа’,	http://itar-tass.com/ekonomika/926789,	
(accessed	on:	30	January	2014).	
66	 According	to	unofficial	opinions	of	decision-makers	from	the	Russian	Ministry	of	Energy,	if	
OPAL	and	NEL	and	South	Stream	are	not	excluded	from	the	third	energy	package,	it	is	pos-
sible	that	other	Russian	firms,	Gazprom’s	competitors,	will	be	given	access	to	the	pipelines.	
This	would	in	fact	mean	demonopolisation	of	Russian	exports.	This	solution	has	never	been	
put	forward	officially.	However,	apparently,	this	option	is	being	considered	unofficially.	The	
idea	to	split	Gazprom	into	two	companies,	which	would	be	put	in	charge	of	gas	production	
and	transport,	which	was	suggested	some	time	ago,	is	also	being	mentioned.	A	source	of	the	
Russian	newspaper	Kommersant	at	the	Presidential	Administration	has	confirmed	that	the	
Gazprom	split	issue	has	been	brought	to	a	high	level. ‘Роснефть готовится к разделению 
Газпрома’,	Коммерсантъ,	19	April	2013.
67	 The	final	version	of	the	amended	Energy	Strategy	of	Russia	for	the	period	up	to	2035	is	to	
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that	Gazprom’s	position	is	very	likely	to	be	further	reduced.	According	to	this	
document,	the	main	goals	of	Russian	energy	policy	in	the	coming	years	should	
include	stimulating	the	development	of	the	so-called	independent	gas	produc-
ers,	providing	all	gas	market	participants	with	equal	access	to	the	transport	
infrastructure	 operated	 by	Gazprom	 and	 ending	 the	 process	 of	 unbundling	
the	various,	mutually	competing,	kinds	of	activity	being	conducted	as	part	of	
the	state-owned	company	Gazprom68	(this	ambiguous	formula	is	 interpreted	
partly	as	a	suggestion	to	unbundle	production	from	transport	and	entrust	two	
separate	entities,	in	organisational	and	legal	terms,	with	these	tasks).	
Further	liberalisation	is	also	becoming	more	likely	as	the	so-called	independ-
ent	gas	producers	are	consistently	gaining	significance.	These	are,	above	all,	
Novatek	and	Rosneft,	which	are	making	efforts	to	strengthen	their	position	at	
home	and	on	foreign	markets.	These	two	companies	have	announced	that	their	
gas	output	by	2020	will	increase	to	115–120	bcm	and	100	bcm,	respectively.	Al-
though	Rosneft	demands	at	present	to	be	given	the	opportunity	to	export	gas	to	
the	Chinese	market,	it	is	very	likely	that	the	process	of	demonopolisation	of	gas	
exports	as	part	of	the	pipeline	system	will	also	cover	gas	supplies	to	the	Euro-
pean	market	in	the	longer	run.	This	will	be	an	effect	of	not	only	lobbying	from	
the	so-called	independent	gas	producers	(above	all,	Novatek,	one	proof	of	which	
are	the	words	of	Gennady	Timchenko,	who	announced	during	the	international	
economic	forum	in	Saint	Petersburg	that	his	company	was	ready	to	supply	gas	
to	Europe	 through	the	pipeline	system)	but	also	of	a	strategic	decision	taken	
by	the	Russian	government	in	response	to	Gazprom’s	decreasing	efficiency	and	
mounting	challenges	(above	all,	regulatory)	on	the	European	market69.	
2.2. Overcoming	backwardness	in	the	LNG	sector	
One	consequence	of	the	development	of	the	liquefied	natural	gas	market	on	the	
global	scale	(including	the	promising	opportunities	for	the	development	of	re-
gasification	infrastructure	in	Europe	and	Asia)	is	Russia’s	more	active	engage-
ment	in	the	LNG	sector.	Over	the	past	year	or	so,	Russian	energy	companies	
be	presented	to	the	government	by	the	minister	for	energy	on	1	October	2014,	http://www.
energy-experts.ru/news13094.html	(accessed	on:	12	May	2014).	
68	 ‘Основные положения проекта энергетической стратегии России на период до 2035 года’,	
http://minenergo.gov.ru/documents/razrabotka/17481.html	(accessed	on:	23	January	2014).	
69	 Szymon	 Kardaś,	 ‘The	 creeping	 ‘de-Gazpromisation’	 of	 Russian	 exports’,	 OSW Analyses,	
11	 June	 2014,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-06-11/creeping-de-
gazpromisation-russian-exports
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have	demonstrated	high	determination	as	regards	the	implementation	of	LNG 
projects in an attempt to catch up with other countries active in this sec-
tor (Australia,	New	Zealand	and	Qatar,	 to	be	 followed	soon	by	 the	USA	and	
Canada).	Interest	has	been	demonstrated	by	both	gas	(Gazprom	and	Novatek)	
and	oil	firms	(Rosneft).	Although	Asian	markets	(China,	Japan	and	South	Ko-
rea)	are	planned	to	be	the	main	destinations	for	exports,	the	final	version	of	
the	act	liberalising	the	rules	of	LNG	exports	suggests	that	Russian	firms	attach	
similar	 significance	 to	 Europe	 as	 an	 export	 destination.	 This	 has	 been	 con-
firmed	by	both	the	guidelines	adopted	as	part	of	the	LNG	projects	in	progress	
(Novatek,	Total	and	CNPC	as	part	of	the	Yamal-LNG	project	or	Gazprom’s	plans	
to	 build	 a	 gas	 liquefying	plant	 in	 Leningrad	Oblast	 and	LNG	 infrastructure	
in	Kaliningrad	Oblast)	and	the	contracts	concluded	thus	far	(Novatek	signed	
a	contract	envisaging	LNG	supplies	to	Spain	on	23	November	2013).	A	specifica-
tion	of	planned	and	existing	projects	is	provided	in	Table	5.	
Table 5.	The	specification	of	existing	and	planned	Russian	LNG	projects
Project name Key shareholder from Russia
Launch date Production capacity(bcm)
Initial / ultimate
Sakhalin-2 Gazprom 2012	 15	/	20.7
Vladivostok-LNG Gazprom 2018 6.9	/	20.7
Baltic-LNG Gazprom 2020 4.1	/	4.1
Sakhalin-1 Rosneft 2018 6.9	/	13.8
Yamal-LNG Novatek 2017 7.6	/	22.8
Total 40.5	/	82.1
Author’s	calculations	
Considering	the	current	trends	and	the	development	potential	of	the	European	
liquefied	natural	gas	market,	it	is	very	likely	that	the	LNG	sector	will	become	
a	new	vital	area	of	Russian	activity	in	Europe	in	the	longer	run.	This	has	been	
suggested,	for	example,	in	the	official	reasons	given	for	the	gas	export	liber-
alisation	act	concerning	LNG	(the	rapidly	developing	LNG	market	in	the	EU)	
and	the	official	moves	and	statements	from	Novatek.	On	1	November	2013,	one	
day	after	the	bill	had	been	approved	by	the	government,	Novatek	announced	
that	it	had	signed	a	25-year	contract	with	Spain’s	largest	importer	of	liquefied	
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natural	gas,	Gas	Natural	Fenosa,	and	has	since	then	declared	interest	in	more	
extensive	LNG	exports	to	Europe.	
By	 demonopolising	 gas	 exports,	 which	 have	 been	 traditionally	 associated	
with	the	Gazprom	brand,	which	is	less	and	less	useful	in	both	political	and	
economic	terms,	and	by	providing	Gazprom’s	competitors	with	access	to	ex-
port	infrastructure,	Russia	is	making	an	attempt	to	maintain	its	position	on	
this	strategic	market.	The	increasingly	likely	extension	of	export	liberalisa-
tion	rules	to	gas	supplied	via	pipelines,	albeit	disadvantageous	to	Gazprom,	
may	bring	tangible	benefits	to	the	Russian	gas	market	as	a	whole.	A	complete	
demonopolisation	of	Russian	gas	exports	and	access	to	pipeline	infrastruc-
ture	 guaranteed	 to	 other,	 competitive,	 Russian	 gas	 firms,	 combined	 with	
restructuring	 of	 Gazprom,	might	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 contribute	 to	 resolving	
the	legal	problems	in	gas	relations	between	Russia	and	the	EU	(the	possible	
split	of	Gazprom	into	separate	companies	in	charge	of	gas	production,	tran-
sit	 and	exports	would	match	 the	 liberalisation	 changes	 taking	place	 in	EU	
countries).	On	the	other	hand,	the	demonopolisation	would	make	it	easier	for	
Russia	to	retain	its	present	position	in	Europe,	which	it	views	as	a	strategic	
market	(Russia	exports	gas	not	only	via	the	pipeline	system	but	also	in	the	
form	of	LNG,	carried	out	by	both	Gazprom	and	other	so-called	independent	
gas	producers).
2.3. Price	discounts	for	EU	customers	and	the	restricted	modification		
of	the	contract	policy
 In	an	attempt	to	counteract	the	negative	consequences	of	the	falling	demand	
for	Russian	gas,	and	given	the	oversupply	of	natural	gas	in	Europe,	Gazprom	
has	been	forced	to	partly	revise	its	price	policy.	One	proof	of	this	has	been	the 
reduction of gas prices as	part	of	supplies	to	selected	European	customers	
(the	list	of	entities	which	have	been	granted	discounts	is	provided	in	Table	
6).	The	discounts	offered	by	Gazprom	to	its	European	recipients	cost	US$2.7	
billion	in	2012	(according	to	Gazprom’s	sources,	US$3.2	billion70),	and	US$4.7	
billion	in	2013.	
70	 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-04/gazprom-cuts-2013-gas-export-price-fore-
cast-amid-contract-talks.html	
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Table 6.	Gas	price	discounts	granted	by	Gazprom	to	European	customers	
(estimated	data))	71	72	73	74	75
Country Company Discount date Size 
Austria Econgas 17	January	2012
10	December	2013
10–15%
10–15%
Czech 
Republic
RWE	
Transgas
Arbitration	proceedings	
launched	in	2011
The	court	passed	a	decision	
unfavourable	to	Gazprom		
in	June	201371
France GDF	Suez 17	January	2012 10–15%
Greece72 DEPA February	2014 15	%
Holland Shell	Europe
Gas	Terra
June	2011
Modification	of	the	price	
formula	(45%	of	the	price	
is	oriented	to	spot	market	
prices)
Lithuania Lietuvos	
Dujos
Arbitration	proceedings	
launched	in	October	2012
A	deal	on	price	discount	
announced	in	May	2014	
around	20%	(as	announced	
by	Lietuvos	Dujos)73
71	 The	 size	 of	 this	price	discount	has	not	been	 revealed.	 ‘Arbitration	Court	Rules	 In	RWE’s	
Favor	In	Gas	Pricing	Dispute	With	Gazprom’,	27	June	2013,	http://www.rttnews.com/2142717/
arbitration-court-rules-in-rwe-s-favor-in-gas-pricing-dispute-with-gazprom.aspx	
(accessed	on:	7	May	2014).
72	 DEPA	initially	insisted	on	a	20%	discount	(from	the	present	level	of	US$460	per	1000	m3	to	
US$370	per	1000	m3).	In	turn,	the	Russian	side	at	the	beginning	agreed	to	reduce	the	price	
to	US$389-399	per	1000	m3,	i.e.	by	around	13%.	DEPA	was	one	of	the	first	companies	to	have	
succeeded	in	obtaining	a	price	discount	in	negotiations	with	Gazprom	back	in	2011;	‘Греция 
настаивает на большем’, Коммерсантъ,	13	February	2014,	http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/2406797
73	 	According	to	reports,	the	discount	has	been	granted	within	the	timeframe	from	1	July	2014	to	
31	December	2015,	and	the	discounted	price	will	be	US$370	per	1000	m3.	‘Литва договорилась 
с Газпромом о снижении цены на газ’,	http://1prime.ru/gas/20140508/784473530.html	(ac-
cessed	on:	8	May	2014).
74	 ‘E.Оn подал новый арбитражный иск к Газпрому’, Ведомости, 4	 July	 2014,	 http://
www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/28582871/eon-podal-novyj-arbitrazhnyj-isk-k-
gazpromu#ixzz37RZDc8xX	(accessed	on:	10	July	2014).
75	 The	contract	provides	for	supplies	of	1.5	billion	m3	of	Russian	gas	annually	until	2021.	‘Rus-
sia,	Serbia	Sign	Long-Term	Gas	Supply	Deal’,	http://en.ria.ru/business/20130327/180283903/
Russia-Serbia-Sign-Long-Term-Gas-Supply-Deal.html	(accessed	on:	8	June	2014).
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Country Company Discount date Size 
Germany
WinGas	
GmbH
17	January	2012 10–15%
E.ON
July	2012	(preceded	by	
the	launch	of	arbitration	
proceedings)
10%	
April	2014	–	arbitration	
proceedings	concerning	
a	further	price	discount	were	
launched74
–
RWE
June	2013	(as	a	consequence	
of	arbitration	proceedings)
15%
Poland PGNiG November	2012	(preceded	by	
arbitration	proceedings)
10–15%
Serbia Srbijagas 27	March	2013 13%75	
Slovakia SPP 17	January	2012
April	2014	
10–15%
10–15%
the	modification	of	the	‘take	
or	pay’	formula	
Italy
Sinergie	
Italiane
17	January	2012 10–15%	
Eni
2010 15%
2012
15%	(probably)	US$1.15	billion	
annually
23	May	2014
change	in	the	price	formula	
and	the	introduction	of	less	
strict	‘take	or	pay’	rule	
Edison
22	July	2011	(preceded	by	
the	launch	of	arbitration	
proceedings	in	2010)
change	in	the	price	formula	
and	the	introduction	of	less	
strict	‘take	or	pay’	rule
Author’s	calculations	based	on	information	published	in	the	Russian	dailies	Ведомости and 
Коммерсантъ	and	in	specialist	energy	portals
Most	of	the	discounts	have	been	granted	as	a	consequence	of	business	negotia-
tions	and	on	the	basis	of	the	price	revision	clauses	included	in	the	contracts.	
Although	the	average	price	of	Russian	gas	has	fallen	across	the	entire	EU	(in	
2013,	it	was	US$402	per	1000	m3	as	compared	to	US$ 416.8	per	1000	m3	in	2012)76,	
76	 Data	made	public	by	GazpromExport	at	the	end	of	December	2013	http://www.vestifinance.
ru/articles/37532	(accessed	on:	13	June	2014).
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the	countries	which	have	benefited	most	 from	the	conciliatory	stance	 taken	
by	the	Russian	company	are	those	from	Western	Europe.	In	the	case	of	Cen-
tral	European	countries,	which	are	heavily	dependent	on	Russian	supplies,	the	
discounts	have	been	granted	on	a	selective	basis,	often	under	threat	of	or	fol-
lowing	the	launch	of	arbitration	proceedings,	most	of	which	ended	disadvan-
tageously	to	Gazprom77.	The	‘division’	of	European	clients	into	those	who	can	
be	treated	on	preferential	terms	and	those	who	can	be	discriminated	against	
is	also	evident	when	one	compares	the	prices	paid	for	Russian	gas	by	Western	
European	and	Central	European	states	(Table	7).	
Table 7.	The	average	annual	gas	price	for	individual	EU	member	states	
Country
Average annual gas price (US$)
2011 2012 2013
Lithuania 397 520 480
Greece 414 475 469
Slovakia 333 428 438
Poland 420 433 429
Latvia 397 440 420
Estonia 397 440 420
Hungary 383 416 418
France 399 398 404
Austria 387 394 402
Czech	Republic 419 500 400
77	 	Arbitration	proceedings	were	launched,	for	example,	by	Poland’s	PGNiG	in	February	2012	
in	 order	 to	 be	 granted	 a	 price	 discount.	 Finally,	 a	 business	 compromise	was	 reached	 in	
November	2012,	and	 the	Polish	side	withdrew	 its	petition	 to	 the	Stockholm	Court	of	Ar-
bitration.	Another	example	 is	provided	by	the	proceedings	 initiated	by	Gazprom	against	
the	Czech	company	RWE	Transgaz,	demanding	payment	for	gas	untaken	in	2008–2011.	The	
arbitration	court	in	Vienna	ruled	in	favour	of	the	Czech	company	and	ruled	that,	given	the	
situation	on	the	market,	RWE	Transgaz	had	reasonably	refused	to	comply	with	the	‘take	or	
pay’	clause.
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Country
Average annual gas price (US$)
2011 2012 2013
Holland 366 346 400
Italy 410 438 399
Slovenia 377 400 396
Bulgaria 356 435 394
Romania 390 424 387
Denmark 480 394 382
Finland 358 373 367
Germany 379 353 366
United	Kingdom - 313 285
Average	annual	gas	price	for	EU	
customers
392.3 416.8 402
Average	annual	gas	price	for	
European	customers	(including	
non-EU	member	states)
398.8 421 387
Source:	James	Henderson,	Simon	Pirani	(ed.),	‘The	Russian	Gas	Matrix:	How	Markets	are	Driving	Chan-
ge’,	Oxford	University	Press	2014.
42
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 9
/2
01
4
Chart 2.	The	degree	of	EU	countries’	dependence	on	Russian	supplies,	and	gas	
prices	for	each	of	the	recipients
Austria
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Source:	www.eurogas.org,	James	Henderson,	Simon	Pirani	(red.),	The	Russian	Gas	Matrix:	How	Markets	
are	Driving	Change,	Oxford	University	Press	2014.
While	Gazprom	is	ready	to	offer	temporary	discounts	 to	selected	customers,	
in	principle,	with	a	few	exceptions78,	it is not willing to accept proposals to 
change the price formula which	envisage	 that	gas	prices	will	no	 longer	be	
based	on	 the	prices	of	 crude	oil	 and	petroleum	products	and	 instead	be	 ref-
erenced	 to	 spot	market	 prices.	 Gazprom’s	 representatives	 have	 argued	 that	
the	volatility	of	prices	on	the	spot	markets	adversely	affects	the	certainty	of	
78	 One	 example	 is	 the	modification	 of	 the	 price	 formula	 in	 contracts	with	 recipients	 from	
North-Western	Europe,	above	all	with	Holland’s	Gas	Terra	(in	autumn	2011,	45%	of	the	price	
formula	was	based	on	spot	market	prices).	On	average,	Gazprom	accepts	the	share	of	spot	
market	prices	 in	 the	basket	on	which	 the	final	price	 is	based	at	a	 level	 ranging	between	
15%	and	25%.	‘Spot	Price	Insurgency’,	http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/spot-gas-pricing-
versus-oil-linked-contracts	(accessed	on:	10	January	2014).	
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business	relations	between	the	gas	supplier	and	the	customer	and,	more	im-
portantly,	gives	no	guarantee	that	adequate	income	will	be	generated,	while	
a	significant	part	of	this	income	is	allocated	for	investments	in	the	Russian	up-
stream	sector.	
However,	it	is	very	likely	that	the	rapid	development	of	the	spot	markets	will	
force	Gazprom	 to	 adjust	 its	 trade	 policy.	 The	 evolution	 of	 the	market	 situ-
ation	will	make	European	gas	 importers	more	assertive,	 and	 they	will	 be-
come	bolder	in	questioning	the	contracting	policy	employed	by	the	Russian	
company	thus	far.	Representatives	of	Italy’s	Eni	announced	back	in	autumn	
2012	that	they	would	insist	on	the	cancellation	of	the	‘take	or	pay’	clause	or	
a	change	in	the	rules	of	gas	price	indexation,	where	the	prices	will	no	longer	
be	based	on	crude	oil	and	petroleum	product	prices	but	instead	on	the	spot	
market	prices.	The	deal	signed	with	Gazprom	in	May	2014	provides	that	spot	
market	prices	will	be	taken	into	account	in	the	price	formula	with	regard	to	
the	entire	amount	of	gas	contracted79.	The	outcome	of	the	antitrust	investiga-
tion	may	also	force	Gazprom	to	modify	its	contract	policy.	According	to	press	
reports,	the	greater	part	of	the	European	Commission’s	reservations	concern	
precisely	 the	price	policy	adopted	by	Gazprom.	The	European	Commission	
expects	that	Gazprom	should	as	part	of	its	obligations	offer	more	flexible	con-
tracting	terms:	a	choice	between	the	spot	formula	and	a	formula	based	on	oil	
and	petroleum	product	prices80.
2.4. The	partial	adjustment	to	the	EU’s	market	liberalising	regulations	
Gazprom,	jointly	with	its	European	partners,	has	also	taken	limited	steps	to	
adjust	to	the	new	regulations	liberalising	the	EU	gas	market.	One	example	of	
this	is	the	restructuring	of	Wingas	GmbH	&	Co.	KG	(a	joint	venture	of	Gazprom	
and	 Germany’s	Wintershall)	 which	 was	 finalised	 in	May	 2012.	 As	 a	 conse-
quence	of	this	move,	a	holding	named	Wintershall	&	Gazprom	Beteiligungs-
GmbH	&	Co.	KG	has	been	established	and	separate	entities	operating	as	part	
of	this	holding	have	been	put	in	charge	of	the	various	segments	of	the	natural	
gas	market:	Wingas	GmbH	will	be	responsible	for	gas	trading,	while	GASCADE	
79	 ‘Клиенты Газпрома добиваются смягчения условий’, Ведомости,	15	October	2012,	http://
www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/4998891/ne_beri_i_ne_plati	 (accessed	 on:	 8	 May	
2014);	‘Газпром согласился увеличить зависимость от спотового рынка газа’,	Ведомости,	
4	 July	 2014,	 http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/28561971/gazprom-narushil-tabu	
(accessed	on:	10	July	2014).	
80	 ‘Газпром и ЕК не находят согласия по вопросу цен на газ для Восточной Европы’,	10	Feb-
ruary	2014,	http://www.oilcapital.ru/industry/230896.html	(accessed	on:	7	May	2014).	
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Gastransport	GmbH,	OPAL	Gastransport	GmbH	and	NEL	Gastransport	GmbH	
will	be	in	charge	of	gas	transport	(independent	transmission	operators)	with	
Astora	GmbH	&	Co	KG	 (a	 subsidiary	of	Wingas	GmbH)	operating	 in	 the	gas	
storage	segment.81.
Another	example	is	the	change	of	Gazprom’s	situation	in	Lithuania.	The	Lithu-
anian	government	has	decided	to	implement	the	gas	directive	which	provides	
for	 the	 strictest	 unbundling	 model,	 i.e.	 ownership	 unbundling.	 Gazprom,	
which	along	with	Germany’s	E.ON	and	the	Lithuanian	government	co-owned	
the	Lithuanian	gas	company,	Lietuvos	Dujos,	has	been	forced	to	agree	to	its	un-
bundling	in	compliance	with	the	guidelines	of	the	EU’s	third	energy	package	
(complete	ownership	separation).	The	Lithuanian	prime	minister	announced	
on	17	June	that	Gazprom	had	sold	its	shares	in	two	Lithuanian	state-controlled	
companies	in	the	gas	sector	(blocks	of	37.1%	shares	each)	–	Lietuvos	Dujos	(gas	
distribution)	and	Amber	Grid	(transmission	and	infrastructure	development)	
for	a	price	of	around	120.7	million	euros.	Three	entities	operating	in	three	dif-
ferent	areas	(transport,	distribution	and	infrastructure	development)	are	ex-
pected	to	be	formed	out	of	Lietuvos	Dujos	by	the	end	of	201482.	
Gazprom’s	 long-standing	 resistance	 to	 actions	 taken	by	 the	Lithuanian	gov-
ernment	had	to	be	discontinued	when	its	previous	ally,	the	German	company	
E.ON	Ruhrgas,	withdrew	 from	 the	Lithuanian	market	 and	agreed	 to	 sell	 its	
shares	in	Lithuanian	companies.	Lithuania	thus	became	the	first	EU	member	
state	to	have	forced	Gazprom	to	adjust	to	the	least	favourable	variant	of	unbun-
dling	envisaged	under	the	regulations	of	the	so-called	third	energy	package83.	
81	 Data	as	provided	on	the	official	website	of	Wintershall	&	Gazprom	Beteiligungs-GmbH	&	
Co.	KG	http://www.w-und-g.com/home.html	(accessed	on:	10.07.2013).	
82	 Lithuania	 sets	 gas	 unbundling	 deadline	 for	October	 2014,	 http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2011/10/28/lithuania-gas-unbundling-idUSL5E7LS0YQ20111028	
83	 For	more	see:	Joanna	Hyndle-Hussein,	‘Gazprom	sells	off	its	assets	in	Lithuania’,	OSW Analy­
ses 25	 June	 2014,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-06-25/gazprom-
sells-its-assets-lithuania
45
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 9
/2
01
4
III. SCENARIOS FOR THE DEVELOPmENT OF GAS RELATIONS 
BETwEEN RUSSIA AND THE EU 
The	tension	seen	over	the	past	few	years	 in	Russia-EU	gas	relations	is	 likely	
to	continue	rising	in	the	coming	years	due	to	the	complexity	of	existing	legal	
problems,	the	political	crisis	linked	to	the	situation	in	Ukraine	and	its	implica-
tions	for	Russia-Ukraine-EU	relations,	the	trends	on	the	European	gas	market	
and	the	difference	in	the	interests	of	individual	EU	member	states	in	relations	
with	Russia	as	regards	the	energy	sector.	
1. Possible resolutions to the legal problems in Russia-EU relations
A	political	compromise	on	gas	issues	between	Russia	and	the	European	Union	
is	not	completely	ruled	out	but,	given	the	differences	in	approaches	adopted	by	
the	two	sides,	it	will	be	extremely	difficult	to	reach.	The	EU	(and	especially	the	
European	Commission)	have	made	attempts	over	the	past	few	years	to	show	
a	strong	determination	in	making	sure	that	its	member	states	and	all	entities	
operating	on	 its	 internal	market	 comply	with	EU	energy	 law.	Liberalisation	
aimed	at	improving	competitiveness	on	the	EU	market	and	also	the	desire	to	
transfer	 the	 rules	 resulting	 from	EU	 law	 to	 third	 countries	 are	 the	key	 ele-
ments	of	this	law.	In	turn,	Gazprom	is	guided	by	the	vertical	integration	logic	
(one	entity	in	control	of	production,	transmission	and	sales),	definitely	prefers	
long-term	contracts	and	supports	restrictions	in	access	to	its	fields	for	foreign	
entities,	and	this	contradicts	the	assumptions	of	the	project	aimed	at	building	
the	internal	energy	market	in	the	EU84.	
The	 announcement	 of	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 antitrust	
proceedings	 against	Gazprom	 could	 signify	 a	 breakthrough	moment.	 If	 it	 is	
found	that	the	Russian	company	has	violated	EU	competition	rules,	the	Rus-
sian	rhetoric	will	likely	sharpen	and	the	EU	will	continue	to	be	accused	of	at-
tempting	to	politicise	the	gas	relations.	It	is	very	likely	that,	in	addition	to	criti-
cal	announcements	from	Russian	politicians,	Moscow	will	attempt	to	contest	
the	decisions	using	all	available	legal	means.	
On	the	other	hand,	another	significant	blemish	on	Gazprom’s	reputation	might	
accelerate	the	implementation	of	the	strategy	involving	‘rebranding’	Russia’s	
84	 Sadek	Boussena,	Catherine	Locatelli,	‘Energy	institutional	and	organizational	changes	in	EU	
and	Russia.	Revisiting	gas	relations’,	Economie Du Developpment Durable et De l’Energie,	Octobre	
2012,	http://lepii.upmf-grenoble.fr/IMG/pdf/CR17-2012_energy-institutional_SB-CL.pdf	
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gas	presence	in	Europe	under	the	Kremlin’s	supervision.	Another	factor	which	
makes	this	scenario	more	likely	is	the	intensifying	competition	seen	between	
Gazprom	and	the	so-called	independent	gas	producers	in	Russia,	Rosneft	and	
Novatek.
If	the	antitrust	proceedings	are	concluded	with	a	ruling	unfavourable	to	Rus-
sia,	 the	 process	 of	 building	 a	 symmetric	 energy	 inter-dependence	 between	
the	EU	and	Russia	would	be	 reinforced.	 Firstly,	Moscow	would	find	 it	more	
difficult	 to	 continue	 its	 policy	 of	 dividing	 its	 clients	 into	 privileged	 groups	
(like	 Italy,	Germany	and	France,	with	regard	 to	whom	Gazprom	has	applied	
a	conciliatory	contracting	policy,	with	lower	prices	and	negotiations	concern-
ing	the	partial	use	of	spot	indexation	in	contracts)	and	those	which	it	can	dis-
criminate	against	(mainly	Central	European	countries,	which	heavily	depend	
on	Russian	gas	and	have	suffered	 from	unfair	contracting	practices	used	by	
Gazprom).	Secondly,	the	key	European	gas	buyers	(Italy	and	Germany)	would	
become	more	assertive,	questioning	ever	more	frequently	the	contracting	pol-
icy	adopted	thus	far	by	Russia	(the	expected	rejection	of	the	‘take	or	pay’	clause	
and,	at	least	partially,	replacement	of	gas	price	indexation	based	on	oil	prices	
with	indexation	based	on	spot	prices),	thus	forcing	Gazprom	to	make	further	
concessions.	Thirdly,	the	Central	European	EU	member	states	would	certainly	
become	more	determined	to	implement	fully	the	liberalisation	rules	applicable	
in	the	EU	and	to	make	their	respective	competition	protection	authorities	act	
in	a	more	decisive	fashion.	
2. The implications of the Ukrainian crisis for Russia–EU gas 
relations
The	Ukrainian	crisis	is	another	important	factor	that	will	add	to	the	tension	in	
Russia–EU	gas	relations.	The	political	instability	in	Ukraine	caused	by	Kyiv’s	
initial	withdrawal	from	signing	the	Association	Agreement	with	the	EU	dur-
ing	the	Eastern	Partnership	summit	in	Vilnius,	further	deepened	by	Russian	
acts	of	 sabotage	against	 the	new	government	 in	Kyiv	after	 the	overthrow	of	
President	Viktor	Yanukovych,	might	result	in	a	revision	of	the	rules	of	co-op-
eration	between	Moscow	and	Brussels.	
The	Kremlin	has	capitalised	on	the	Ukrainian	crisis	to	present	Ukraine	to	its	
EU	partners	once	again	as	an	unreliable	trade	partner.	One	proof	of	this	was	the	
letter	addressed	by	President	Putin	on	April	10th	2014	to	the	leaders	of	eighteen	
European	countries	claiming	that	Ukraine	owed	a	huge	debt	for	Russian	gas	
supplies	 (according	 to	Moscow’s	estimates,	 it	 stood	at	US$35.4	billion).	Putin	
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has	appealed	to	European	countries	to	hold	urgent	consultations	concerning	
gas	issues.	He	has	also	threatened	that	unless	the	Ukrainian	debt	problem	is	
resolved,	prepayments	will	be	introduced	in	Russian-Ukrainian	settlements.	
This	in	turn	may	mean	that	Ukraine	will	illegally	receive	the	gas	meant	to	be	
supplied	to	customers	in	the	EU,	in	the	case	of	it	being	unable	to	pay	its	dues.	
However,	the	trilateral	EU-Russia-Ukraine	gas	talks	initiated	on	2	May	2014	in	
Warsaw	have	been	fruitless.	As	a	consequence,	Gazprom	introduced	the	mech-
anism	of	prepayments	in	gas	settlements	with	Naftogaz	on	16	June	2014	and	at	
the	same	time	withheld	gas	supplies	to	Ukraine	until	Ukraine	paid	its	current	
debt	for	the	gas	supplied	from	Russia	(almost	US$4.5	billion	for	gas	supplies	in	
November	and	December	2013	and	in	April	and	May	2014)85.	
Various	actions	taken	by	Russia	signify	its	readiness	to	aggravate	its	gas	dis-
pute	with	Ukraine,	including:	a	 letter	from	President	Putin;	gas	supply	cuts;	
statements	from	representatives	of	the	Russian	political	and	business	elite,	in-
cluding	the	head	of	the	Russian	mission	to	the	EU,	Vladimir	Chizhov	and	the	
president	of	Gazprom,	Alexey	Miller.	Moscow	hopes	that	its	non-resumption	
of	gas	supplies	to	Ukraine	will	force	Kyiv	to	start	using	the	gas	exported	via	
Ukraine	to	recipients	in	the	EU	for	its	own	needs.	Thus	the	Russian-Ukrainian	
gas	crisis	will	be	used	by	Russia	to	make	the	EUchange	its	stance	on	Russian	in-
frastructural	projects	under	development	in	Europe.	Above	all,	Russia	wants	
the	European	Commission	to	pass	a	decision	approving	the	use	of	the	OPAL	gas	
pipeline	at	100%	of	its	capacity	and	to	receive	political	support	for	the	South	
Stream.	The	 latter	would	mean	EU	 institutions	 refraining	 from	questioning	
the	compliance	with	EU	law	of	the	organisational	and	legal	actions	taken	by	
Russia	in	co-operation	with	those	EU	member	states	which	are	engaged	in	the	
project.	If	the	Russian	infrastructural	projects	were	excluded	from	the	regula-
tions	of	the	so	called	third	energy	package,	this	would	not	cause	any	systemic	
changes	in	the	EU,	but	the	significance	of	these	regulations	would	de	facto	be	
undermined.	 Furthermore,	Russia	would	 feel	 encouraged	 to	 continue	 its	 ef-
forts	to	reach	a	political	agreement	with	Brussels	that	would	regulate	the	rules	
of	cross-border	co-operation	in	the	energy	sector.	
85	 For	more	on	the	Russian-Ukrainian	gas	dispute	see:	Szymon	Kardaś,	Wojciech	Konończuk,	
‘Russia	and	Ukraine’s	‘cold	gas	war’’,	OSW Analyses, 25	June	2014,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/analyses/2014-06-25/russia-and-ukraines-cold-gas-war	
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3. The limited possibilities of change in supplies on the EU gas 
market 
Russia’s	assertiveness	will	strengthen	as	the	present	trends	on	the	European	
gas	supply	market	continue,	especially	the	decrease	in	LNG	supplies	to	the	EU	
market,	the	constant	reduction	in	Europe’s	own	production	and	the	growing	
supply	of	Russian	gas,	all	of	which	have	been	evident	over	the	past	few	years.	
Furthermore,	Azerbaijan,	Turkmenistan,	Iraq	and	Iran	might	join	the	poten-
tial	 group	of	pipeline	gas	 suppliers	 to	Europe.	As	a	 consequence	of	 this,	 gas	
supplies	to	Europe	could	rise	up	to	as	much	as	50	bcm	(as	part	of	the	Southern	
Corridor	around	10	bcm	could	be	supplied	from	Azerbaijan,	10	bcm	from	Iran86	
and	potentially	up	to	30	bcm	from	Iraq)87.	However,	given	the	slow	progress	
in	 the	 implementation	of	 the	 infrastructural	pipeline	projects	 supported	by	
the	EU	(the	construction	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	project,	although	it	was	
finally	approved	in	June	2013,	will	be	completed	no	sooner	than	2018),	any	alter-
native	to	Russian	pipeline	gas	supplies	seems	to	be	rather	unrealistic,	at	least	
within	the	next	three	or	four	years.	
The	development	of	infrastructure	which	enables	imports	of	liquefied	natural	
gas	might	play	a	key	role	in	the	diversification	of	gas	supply	sources.	The	re-
gasification	capacity	in	EU	member	states	almost	tripled	in	the	2000s	(reach-
ing	185.46	bcm	in	2014),	and	is	planned	to	be	developed	further	until	2020.	In	
the	optimistic	scenario,	this	may	mean	increasing	import	capacity	to	around	
400	bcm;	while	in	the	pessimistic	scenario,	it	will	be	possible	to	import	around	
378	bcm	of	gas	annually88.	 Israel,	Cyprus	and	Mozambique	could	potentially	
become	new	sources	of	LNG	supplies	to	the	EU	market.	
However,	the	possibility	of	importing	liquefied	natural	gas	from	the	USA	has	
been	 considered	 especially	 intensively	 in	Europe	over	 the	past	 few	months.	
In	the	opinion	of	certain	sections	among	the	European	elite,	this	source	could	
be	 viewed	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 Russian	 supplies.	 Regardless	 of	 the	 political	
86	 According	to	forecasts,	it	will	be	able	to	export	even	30-35	billion	m3	of	gas	in	2020.	‘Иран 
готов соперничать с Россией за поставки газа в Европу’,	Ведомости,	12	August	2014,	http://
www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/32013951/gazovyj-sopernik-rossii#ixzz3BOR8LYiT
87	 Aleksey	Khazbiyev,	‘Никаких компромиссов’,	Эксперт,	no.	5	(884),	27	January	2014,	http://
expert.ru/expert/2014/05/nikakih-kompromissov/?subscribe	(accessed	on:	7	April	2014).	
88	 My	own	calculations	based	on	data	published	by	Gas	Infrastructure	Europe	http://www.
gie.eu.com/	(accessed	on:	2	April	2014).	
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declarations	made	by	President	Barack	Obama,	it	will	be	impossible	to	supply	
liquefied	natural	 gas	 from	 the	USA	 to	Europe	within	 the	next	 three	or	 four	
years.	This	 is	a	matter	of	 legal	 (US	companies	are	required	 to	obtain	export	
licences),	technical	(the	first	LNG	export	terminals	will	be	ready	in	2015	and	
2017,	and	most	of	them	only	by	around	2020),	and	often	purely	economic	as-
pects.	A	comparison	of	gas	production	and	consumption	 forecasts	 in	 the	US	
indicates	 that	potential	major	exports	of	 liquefied	natural	gas	 from	the	USA	
would	not	materialise	before	around	2020.	When	analysing	the	US	data	con-
cerning	gas	consumption	and	domestic	gas	output,	one	should	note	 that	 the	
quantities	of	gas	produced	in	the	USA	that	could	be	allocated	for	exports	will	
be	well	below	the	maximum	export	capacity	of	US	LNG	terminals	(provided	
that	all	projects	have	been	carried	through):	 the	production	surplus	 in	2020	
will	 reach	 around	 15	 bcm,	 and	 terminal	 export	 capacity	 around	 268.2	 bcm.	
Furthermore,	since	gas	prices	are	higher	on	the	Asian	market,	exports	to	such	
countries	as	Japan,	South	Korea	and	China	may	turn	out	to	be	more	appealing	
than	exports	to	Europe89.	
4. The lack of cohesion in EU member states’ energy policy with 
regard to Russia 
Russia	will	also	benefit	from	differences	in	the	energy	policies	adopted	by	indi-
vidual	EU	member	states	and	uncertainty	about	the	strategy	of	action	the	new	
European	Commission	will	take	following	the	elections	to	the	European	Par-
liament	on	25	May	2014.	Some	of	the	EU	member	states,	regardless	of	the	de-
teriorating	political	climate	in	Russia–EU	relations,	do	not	intend	to	withdraw	
from	 developing	 their	 intensive	 and	 comprehensive	 economic	 co-operation	
89	 In	2013,	 the	average	price	of	US	gas	stood	at	US$133.6	per	 1000	m3,	 i.e.	 it	grew	by	around	
34.8%	in	comparison	to	the	preceding	year.	The	average	price	of	liquefied	natural	gas	sup-
plied	to	Japan	from	Indonesia	reached	around	US$627.2	per	1000	m3.	For	comparison,	the	
price	of	Russian	gas	on	 the	border	with	Germany	was	US$402	per	 1000	m3,	and	 the	spot	
market	prices	were	as	 follows:	on	France’s	Powernext	–	US$377	per	 1000	m3	 (up	 11.8%	 in	
comparison	to	2012)	and	on	Germany’s	EEX	–	US$368	per	1000	m3	(up	9.3%	in	comparison	
to	2012).	With	the	price	at	US$133.6	per	1000	m3	(US$3.73	per	MMBtu),	the	total	cost	of	LNG	
supplied	to	Europe	(liquefaction,	transport,	regasification)	would	reach	around	US$296.43	
per	 1000	m3.	The	 forecast	 for	2014	 indicates	 that	 the	average	annual	price	at	Henry	Hub	
will	be	US$4.44	per	MMBtu,	i.e.	US$160.5	per	1000	m3.	Then	the	total	cost	of	gas	supplied	
to	Europe	would	reach	US$328.9	per	1000	m3.	However,	at	present	(data	for	January-June	
2014),	the	Henry	Hub	price	is	US$4,9	per	MMBtu,	i.e.	US$177.5	per	1000	m3,	which	in	the	case	
of	exports	to	Europe	would	give	the	total	cost	of	US$347.4	per	1000	m3.	Furthermore,	if	the	
USA	started	exporting	gas	to	Europe,	the	price	at	Henry	Hub	would	certainly	increase,	and	
thus	the	final	price	of	US	gas	on	the	European	market	would	go	up.	Considering	the	price	
discounts	offered	by	Gazprom	over	the	past	few	months,	it	might	turn	out	that	US	gas	could	
be	less	competitive	than	Russian	gas.	
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with	Moscow.	Examples	of	this	include:	the	statement	from	representatives	of	
Bulgaria,	who	have	declared	full	support	for	the	implementation	of	the	South	
Stream	project;	Hungary’s	policy	targeted	at	intensifying	energy	co-operation	
not	only	 in	 the	gas	sector	but	also	 in	 the	nuclear	sector	 (preliminary	agree-
ments	concerning	the	development	of	the	Hungarian	nuclear	power	plant	in	
Paks	was	 signed	 in	 January	2014);	 the	unclear	 stance	 taken	by	Bratislava	 in	
negotiations	with	Kyiv	concerning	the	possibility	of	carrying	out	reversed	gas	
supplies	from	the	EU	to	Ukraine	(the	lack	of	Slovakia’s	political	will	 is	prob-
ably	an	effect	of	its	fear	of	deterioration	of	relations	with	Gazprom).	The	lack	
of	a	 joint	stance	 is	also	evident	 in	the	case	of	Germany,	Russia’s	key	partner	
in	energy	relations	with	the	EU.	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel’s	critical	rhetoric	
contrasts	with	hints	from	representatives	of	German	business,	suggesting	that	
the	mutually	beneficial	co-operation	needs	to	be	continued.	
The	lack	of	unity	seen	in	the	approaches	adopted	in	the	policies	of	 individu-
al	EU	member	states	makes	 it	very	unlikely	 that	new	effective	mechanisms	
reducing	the	level	of	dependence	on	Russia	will	be	developed.	The	European	
Commission	in	its	conclusions	during	the	summit	of	the	heads	of	state	or	gov-
ernments	on	26–27	June	2014	declared	the	readiness	to	build	an	energy	union,	
albeit	it	did	not	go	as	far	as	the	concept	put	forward	by	Poland	in	April	2014	(one	
of	the	key	ideas	in	the	Polish	concept	was	that	EU	member	states	should	buy	
gas	from	Russia	together	until	energy	dependence	on	Russia	has	been	signifi-
cantly	reduced).	Russia	has	responded	critically	to	the	concepts	put	forward	on	
the	part	of	the	EU	(the	Russian	minister	for	energy,	Alexander	Novak,	branded	
the	idea	to	buy	gas	together	as	a	return	to	the	Soviet	economy),	and	will	stick	
to	its	policy	of	developing	bilateral	relations	in	the	energy	sector,	hoping	that	
it	will	thus	successfully	neutralise	actions	at	the	entire	community	level	initi-
ated	by	EU	institutions.	
***
Russia,	being	aware	of	these	conditions	and	the	volatility	of	trends	on	the	Eu-
ropean	gas	market,	will	attempt	to	continue	its	dichotomous	policy,	taking	in	
parallel	offensive	and	defensive	actions,	albeit	 the	offensive	moves	will	pre-
vail.	The	criticism	of	regulatory	changes	will	be	accompanied	on	the	one	hand	
by	the	determination	to	uphold	the	traditional	strategic	goals	of	external	gas	
policy	(the	diversification	of	transit	routes	and	investments	in	assets)	and,	on	
the	other	hand,	by	a	partial	adjustment	to	the	changing	reality	(for	example,	
developing	LNG	projects,	reducing	gas	prices,	amending	trade	contracts	and	
increasing	sales	on	the	spot	markets).
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The	mutual	 dependence	 of	 Russia	 and	Europe	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 is	 set	 to	
continue	 in	 the	 short	 and	medium	 term.	However,	 given	 the	 differences	 in	
the	Russian	and	European	approaches,	it	is	unlikely	to	undergo	a	transforma-
tion,	in	the	manner	called	for	by	the	president	of	the	European	Commission,	
José	Manuel	Barroso,	from	a	“inter-dependence	out	of	necessity	into	a	inter-
dependence	by	choice”90.	Bilateral	relations	will	continue	to	resemble	those	of	
a	tug	of	war,	where	each	party,	capitalising	on	its	benefits,	will	try	to	pull	the	
rival	towards	its	own	side.	However,	there	is	plenty	to	indicate	that	a	definitive	
winner	in	this	war	is	unlikely	to	emerge	anytime	soon.	
SzymON KARDAś 
90	 The	statement	made	by	José	Manuel	Barroso	during	the	press	conference	at	the	conclusion	
of	the	European	Union	–	Russia	summit	on	21	December	2012	in	Brussels.	
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LNG terminals in the EU, and EU gas infrastructure used by Gazprom
Source:	http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/38/422682/ugs-facilities-abroad-en.jpg
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